Collection of Studies into Local and Regional Public Policies on Social Cohesion

Citizen Security and Social Cohesion in Latin America
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This series of *Studies into Local and Regional Public Policies on Social Cohesion* has been produced by the URB-AL III Programme Orientation and Coordination Office. Its aim is to explore the current situation regarding a set of central problems that form part of the present agenda for political bi-regional European Union-Latin American discussions on social cohesion. This third edition deals with the problem of citizen security and its relation to the issue of local social cohesion.

Since the 1990s, Latin America has witnessed increasing levels of insecurity. The difficulty of containing this insecurity using the existing methods at the time led to the development of different formulas. Some of these formulas backed a (new) centralist response based on taking a 'firm hand'. Others advocated approaches based on strategies that sought to mobilise capacities other than those of the police and central levels of government. These approaches, organised around the concept of citizen security, promoted harmonious coexistence and interpersonal trust as a formula for preventing violence, and supported multilevel coordination as the best way to combat this violence. As a result of these developments, a specific space has opened up for local governments in the matter of security. In this context, local governments have ceased to be mere policy takers and have legitimately been turning into policy makers on this matter.

The active and effective participation of local governments in Latin America brings with it the need to provide a solution to a set of relevant issues. The first of these is capacities: clear decisions must be made regarding investment in and development of local governments’ capacities. Secondly, there is a glaring need for effective coordination with higher levels of government. Furthermore, effective formulas for working and coordinating with the territorial community are also required. Finally, it is necessary to define lines of action and intervention strategies.

Citizen security is an issue in itself. Its importance, however, is even greater if we consider its close relationship with social cohesion. Citizen security is a key element of a cohesive society. For this reason, in the case of insecure societies, it is essential to promote specific public policies whose ultimate goal is social cohesion and which provide an umbrella under which innovative ways of working can emerge.

Addressing the challenge of not only finding a (total or partial) solution to the problem of insecurity but also of building a more cohesive society will lead to the development of more comprehensive public policies.

**Agustí Fernández de Losada**
Director of International Relations at Diputació de Barcelona and General Coordinator of the URB-AL III Programme Orientation and Coordination Office.
This document is a reflection on the principal issues, problems and dilemmas of citizen security. It has a strong regional element; in all the matters discussed, it gives priority to regional examples, as well as possible national differences and strengths. It is a study that focuses mainly on the lessons learned regarding security after more than two decades of intervention. To achieve this, two main sources were used: the contest for best practices in crime prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean, run in 2010 by the Centre for Studies on Public Safety of the University of Chile (CESC), and the International Compendium of Crime Prevention Practices (2008), compiled by the International Centre for the Prevention of Crime (ICPC).

The document is divided into seven sections. The first is dedicated to identifying conceptual changes in the treatment of security: clarifying how the issue is understood, discussed and tackled. In this section, examples are given of human security, democratic security and other forms of naming public policy approaches on this issue and the implications these conceptual frameworks have had on the strategic planning of the sector.

The second section focuses on the new actors involved in security policies, with an emphasis on the role of local governments and citizens, and analyses their advantages and disadvantages. Particular stress is placed on the lack of evidence to justify the ideal types of intervention, while at the same time showing those achievements and clear lines of action that have been the most successful and promising.

The third section discusses the achievements and challenges of citizen security interventions. It details the progress made and setbacks suffered in defining frameworks of interpretation and intervention in this matter. The multidimensionality, complexity and intersectoriality of the approaches are reviewed with the aim of identifying best practices for coordinating all the actors involved.

The fourth section deals with the relationship between citizen security and social cohesion. When considering the theoretical frameworks of both dimensions together, it is possible to see the progress made in the field of interpretation, the policies implemented, the challenges and the achievements obtained from this double perspective.

1. For further information please see: www.comunidadyprevencion.org

2. A summary table with both compilations can be found in the appendix.
The growing levels of insecurity being experienced in Latin America since the start of the 1990s led to a recognition that the best way to tackle the problem was not exclusively from a police angle. The rise in violence, formal complaints and public fear were clear indications that social and economic factors lay at the heart of the problem.

Faced with this situation and from that point on, public, citizen or democratic security initiatives (depending on the country of implementation) began to be characterised by a weakening of police monopoly on solving the problem, the development of multi-sector initiatives and the recognition of prevention as a public policy implementation zone. This change was linked to a conception of violence as a conflictive social relationship, rather than causal determinism, whether of a moral, biological or legal kind, which considers violence as a pathology. With this new paradigm it is thus understood that violence has many different expressions.

Nevertheless, this paradigm shift is a slow process which has not progressed in the same way in all countries and which highlights a clear gap between the new rhetoric about security and the effective investment in these initiatives. This is how public, citizen and democratic security projects, as we have seen that the progress made in terms of interpretation has not necessarily been accompanied by management capacities (in either central or local government) that encourage the implementation of comprehensive policies.

The sixth section continues with the most technical aspects. It focuses on evaluation, identifying the thematic developments and the existing management problems, as work still needs to be done on processes and methodologies that enable the impact of the initiatives to be evaluated.

Finally, the last section presents the conclusions and recommendations, defining the main challenges and offering some useful action proposals on both a national and local level.

1. From internal security to citizen security

The fifth section analyses the outstanding challenges of managing citizen security projects, as we have seen that the progress made in terms of interpretation has not necessarily been accompanied by management capacities (in either central or local government) that encourage the implementation of comprehensive policies.

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Chart 1 does not only show the high level of victimisation and homicides in various countries, but also highlights that those countries with the highest rates of victimisation are the ones that had the lowest homicide rates in 2008, which suggests a territorial variety of violence and the clear weakness of information systems that are not sufficiently comprehensive. Thus, homicide indicators cannot be the only way to describe the situation of violence and insecurity in a country, instead a variety of indicators relating to different crimes which also generate fear despite being non-violent should be used. In this regard, a more complete overview would enable us to dismiss hypotheses based on conspiracy theories created by the mass media or party politics in countries considered to be safe, but that have high levels of public fear (such as, for example, Chile and Uruguay). In other words, saying that countries are safe because of their low homicide rate would be showing only a part of the real situation.

and have weak or non-existent social protection systems.

In parallel, reforms of criminal proceedings have been designed to increase the quality, effectiveness and fairness of the criminal trials. Although in most Latin-American countries the justice reform is still in progress, the need for faster, more transparent and efficient systems has been linked to crime-fighting policies. Often compared to a ‘revolving door’ (a metaphor routinely used to describe the governmental response), the justice reform was taken as a protective process which, in some way or other, would provide the tools for murderers to avoid punishment. This situation led to amendments and reforms of the schemes that had originally been proposed, providing the police with greater powers to act and limiting alternative measures to imprisonment.

Finally, the explosive growth of the prison population has fostered a huge structural crisis, characterised by overcrowding, poor living conditions and zero capacity for reintegration or rehabilitacion. Not only do adults serving their sentences receive a dreadful service, but also the systems and institutions responsible for juvenile offenders are clearly in crisis too and offer services that are powerless to halt the development of incipient criminal careers.

Chart 2 shows the percentage of prison overpopulation – a problem for which almost no country in the region has figures on near-term solutions. The creation of infrastructure will not resolve the problem of overpopulation in the short term, not to mention the precarious conditions found in most prisons.

To sum up, the institutional framework of control policies is weak, marked by inefficiency and a public perception of chaos and institutional corruption. This situation has resulted in an exponential increase in privatisation and public distrust of governmental action. In fact, as can be seen in recent publications of the Americas Barometer and the Latino-barometer, the justice system and the police are among the least trusted institutions in the region.*

To respond to these levels of insecurity –objective or subjective– the political agenda in part of the region has developed measures to control crime (increasing police presence, making punishments more severe, reducing the age of criminal responsibility, among others). Thus, so-called penal populism* has been adopted as a way of demonstrating governmental concern on this issue. However, strictly speaking this approach focuses on communication rather than on real administration, as the aim is to present the supposed results in the short-term. In many cases, law enforcement organisations have significantly increased their budgets, with funds dedicated to patrolling and technological infrastructure for improving investigation and deterrence capacities. Nevertheless, this investment has not managed to resolve the serious problems of lack of resources facing police officers who are poorly-paid and have weak or non-existent social protection systems.

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This rather gloomy outlook is linked to the governmental structures set up recently to design and run prevention programmes. Most of these new institutions do not have sufficient budgets to implement their initiatives, nor do they have the qualified human resources to carry out the complex task of institutional coordination and programme design. Prevention, understood as police presence, social programmes and public intervention, has therefore only been rather timidly introduced over the last decade.

The concept of public security mainly involves maintaining public order, understood as a calm situation and social peace established through law enforcement. To do this, the main instruments of public security are the police, the justice system and the penitentiary system. The problem of basing internal security solely on these three pillars is that it centres on policies for suppressing crime. In Latin America this has been done by introducing changes such as lowering the age of criminal responsibility, increasing sentences for all type of offences (especially those with more serious social impact or which respond to a specific situation) and the intensive use of custodial sentences.

The clearest example of this phenomenon were the so-called firm hand and super firm hand policies developed in El Salvador during the administrations of Francisco Flores and Antonio Saca. The Firm Hand Plan was created in 2003, when the then president of the Republic, Francisco Flores, ordered the deployment of a police contingent led by officers from not only the National Civil Police (NCP), but also from the armed forces, with the aim of reducing crime by dismantling youth gangs in urban and rural areas and arresting all their members. This led to mass detentions in densely populated areas of San Salvador of young people who belonged to, or appeared to belong to, youth gangs. At the same time, the ‘Antimaras’ bill (named after the mara criminal gangs) was put before the Legislative Assembly and was approved for a period of six months (10 October 2003-10 April 2004). The result of this plan clearly demonstrates the poor utilisation of police resources (see table 1).

Between 23 July 2003 and 30 August 2004, the National Civil Police reported the arrest of 19,275 people accused of belonging to gangs. 17,540 (91%) were released almost immediately. Of these, 1,548 people (8%) were provisionally acquitted as, despite being accused of some type of crime, there was insufficient evidence, and in 16,191 (84%) of those cases the charges were dropped completely as there was no reason for their detention. 771 (4%) people were under administrative detention awaiting a judicial hearing. Only 964 people arrested (5%) were provisionally detained by court warrant.

On 30 August 2004, President Antonio Saca announced that he would maintain the same policy, giving his support to the Super Firm Hand Plan – a much more aggressive strategy against the maras and other gangs, which did not include any prevention or rehabilitation measures. Alongside this announcement, the Legislative Assembly approved criminal law reforms which increased penalties to up to 75 years. At the same time as these plans were being implemented the country experienced a rise in the number of homicides, which demonstrated once again the ineffectiveness of these types of initiatives.

El Salvador is perhaps the clearest and most dramatic example of the excesses that public security can reach if they are not counterbalanced in other areas, but in all the countries in Latin America the firm hand approach has been seen in one form or another, and although this method may yield visible results in the
short term, it does not provide a long-term solution to the problem, but instead ends up increasing the stigmatisation and marginalisation of certain social groups.

To tackle levels of insecurity—objective or subjective—other countries in the region introduced responses based on the concept of citizen security, which fostered interpersonal coexistence with the idea that this would significantly improve the security situation. In a context in which the key is social coexistence, the state is responsible for guaranteeing citizenship, i.e., respecting citizens’ duties and rights. This concept has given rise to initiatives in which diverse actors, such as municipalities, the media and civil society organisations, all have a role to play.

Beyond integrating the community as an active agent of their own security and updating the role of municipalities, the multidimensional nature of citizen security has had an impact on the institutions responsible for this matter on an executive level. Traditionally, the police force has reported to the ministries of the interior or government, but new dimensions of security have led to the development of ministries and structures exclusively dedicated to this issue. These aspects will be discussed in more detail in the following sections, which cover initiatives focused on control and punishment, as well as prevention and the involvement of communities in their own security.

In the mid-1990s, other ideas also began to filter through, mainly from international organisations, which advocated adopting a comprehensive security framework: human security, multidimensional security and democratic security.

Human security arose from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which indicated in its report 'New Dimensions of Human Security' (1994) that there are two conditions that guarantee human security: a population free from fear and a population free from want. This concept, which focuses on human beings (as opposed to national security, which focuses on the state), is related to the fact that people’s feeling of insecurity is mainly linked to the preoccupations of daily life. For this reason human development is linked to security. Human development consists of increasing opportunities, and security, and the chance to enjoy these liberties. This concept assumes a universal concern for human life and dignity, its components are inter-dependent and the threats to security are of a global nature. The report defines six dimensions that form part of human security and their main concerns: economic, health, environmental, personal, community and political.

Although in the original concepts citizen security is more inclusive, this does not mean that control and prevention are exclusive—they should instead be complementary. These aspects have been discussed in more detail in the following sections, which cover initiatives focused on control and punishment, as well as prevention and the involvement of communities in their own security.

The positive points highlighted in this idea include its focus on people and its inclusive nature, as well as its multidimensional character and emphasis on multilateralism and cooperation, but at the same time its scope of action is very broad and it introduces the concept of security into other areas of development. Nevertheless, the difficulties of operating with such a broad concept had a clear impact on the Organization of American States (OAS), which began to use the concept of ‘multidimensional security’.

The origin of this conceptualisation of security as a multidimensional phenomenon in the OAS date back to the Declaration on Security in the Americas from 2003, the focus of which maintains that ‘security in the Hemisphere is multidimensional in scope, includes traditional and new threats, concerns, and other challenges to the security of the states of the Hemisphere, incorporates the priorities of each state, contributes to the consolidation of peace, integral development, and social justice, and is based on democratic values, respect for and promotion and defence of human rights, solidarity, cooperation, and respect for national sovereignty.’ This was reflected in the OAS’s institutional structure, with the creation of the Secretariat for Multidimensional Security in 2005 and the Department of Public

7. Later, the debate surrounded two reports: ‘Human security now’ (2001), by the Commission on Human Security (creation in the context of the UN Millennium Summit) and ‘The responsibility to protect’ (2005), by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, both focused on protecting people and their development conditions within the framework of respecting human rights and democratic principles.

Security in 2006. Thus, it was decided that all matters relating to security, independently of the area this referred to (internal, international, public, citizen, etc.), would be the responsibility of one specific body. On a regional level, this led to the creation of the Meeting of Ministers of Public Security of the Americas (MISPA), a body that unites the different ministries on public security matters in the Americas and which has attempted to establish a common framework of understanding of issues relating to public security on the continent.

The concept of democratic security, in turn, was developed by Central-American countries in the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security (1995). This model of security is based on the supremacy and strengthening of the structure of civil society, the reasonable balance of forces, the security of persons and of their property, the elimination of poverty and extreme poverty, the promotion of sustainable development, the protection of the environment, and the eradication of violence, corruption, impunity, terrorism, drug trafficking, and arms trafficking.

The concept also targets human security, but places even stronger emphasis on the importance of eliminating poverty for obtaining acceptable levels of security and highlights other aspects, such as the supremacy of the power of civil society over the armed forces, based on the particular experience of military governments in the region.9

To sum up, from different angles this conceptual change has led to a consideration of the person as the prime objective of security institutions, moving away from the central role of the state. Although this has involved a comprehensive outlook of security which was certainly long overdue, we must not forget that not all of the phenomena that affect human development should be treated as a matter of security, as we would run the risk of focusing the public agenda on security and overlooking other real problems. Thus, situations of poverty, marginalisation, lack of employment opportunities, violence in schools and addictions, among others, should only be connected with institutions in charge of security in those cases in which they are the cause of violence and crime, without becoming generalisations that only lead to stigmatising disadvantaged groups.

9. It should be mentioned that the idea of ‘democratic security’ was also widely promoted in Colombia during the administration of President Álvaro Uribe. This policy established the strong presence of security bodies in the country, in close collaboration with society.

Although this policy enabled the state to regain control of certain territories, its impact came under question, above all with regards the involvement of civilians and that it was in fact based on the Doctrine of National Security. In this context, there was much criticism of the ‘false positive’ scandal in which civilians killed by the Colombian armed forces were falsely accused of belonging to the guerrillas.
In the conceptual development process on security that has taken place since the 1990s, one of the actors that has held the greatest importance in the implementation of programmes to help reduce levels of insecurity in the population has been municipalities. This is due to the fact that local authorities have a characteristic which allows them to lead prevention programmes and better coordinate with organisations of civil society to offer services. This highly-valued characteristic is the municipalities’ proximity to their communities. This is an extremely important element when analysing the particular problems of an area and designing policies that are both efficient and effective at preventing violence, as municipalities are the ones with the knowledge of the territory, the population, the social capital and the available resources. As a result, interventions can be better focused and this increases the likelihood of making a significant impact.

Municipalities’ knowledge of their communities can be effectively utilised in both the process of diagnosis and in the implementation of programmes. When analysing the problems it is always necessary to listen to the perceptions that municipal authorities and officials have of the community as, given their years of experience of running social programmes, they can easily identify the principal needs, sectors or most critical neighbourhoods in terms of vulnerability and insecurity, and the type of demands of the community.

The large network of institutions that are usually involved in providing municipal social services (health, education, recreation, maintenance of public spaces, etc.) is also an area that should be taken advantage of, as it facilitates inter-sector coordination, not only because of the physical proximity, but also because they share a common user. This is where the concept of association comes from as a necessary strategy for tackling crime: association among state agencies and between the community and public bodies.

The *Ação na linha* (‘Action on line’) project, implemented by the Sou da Paz Institute in São Paulo, is a good example of the use of qualitative information supplied by municipalities, given that police and national statistics do not provide the contextual information that other instruments can help to collect. Thus, different areas of the municipal government were consulted, such as those in charge of health, education, culture, sport and those directly related to controlling crime (such as the police).

These types of actions not only serve to gather information, but they can also promote the projects within the municipalities and gain the support of a network of local stakeholders. A good example of working in networks within the same municipality can be found in Peñalolén, Santiago, which, through projects like its *Plan Integral Barrios Seguros* (‘Safe Neighbourhoods Integrated Plan’) and *Construyendo a Tiempo* (‘Building in Time’), has built ties between...
the different municipal bodies and the police, schools and the community, which has enabled it to approach prevention from various angles, using pre-existing municipal capacity, but refocusing it on new objectives.

It is also important to bear in mind that as part of the processes of administrative decentralisation carried out in the region local governments have had to take on more responsibilities in security matters. In Colombia, for example, the Political Constitution stipulates that municipal mayors are the directors of the police forces in each municipality and, therefore, are responsible for handling security. This situation varies from country to country: some do not have powers over the police and others manage local police forces. Whatever the case, local governments require the support of provincial and national governments to carry out research and analyse information on the causes of criminal violence, as well as to coordinate the stakeholders involved, organise investment and police work, and collaboration with non-governmental organisations (NGOs), as municipalities do not always have the suitable capacities and it could be very expensive to develop them. Therefore, the work is of a highly collaborative nature.

Despite the multiplicity of stakeholders, demands and problems linked to developing efficient and effective crime prevention policies and programmes, it is vital that the solutions are simple and focus on dealing with a limited number of problems, but sustainably, i.e., it must be possible to maintain successful programmes and interventions. This is particularly relevant when the projects run in municipalities rely on international cooperation or private contributions, as often they do not manage to generate sufficient resources to keep the programme in question running.

Together with the abovementioned, another important element in the equation is community participation. The community plays a vital role by helping municipalities to identify and prioritise problems, as well as assisting with the design and implementation of preventive measures. Consolidating the community is viewed as a process linked to reducing crime and the opportunity to commit crime, defending it against outsiders and forming a homogeneous, and therefore safe, social space. However, not every community idea is useful, as this can generate stigmatisation and segregation of spaces and groups. The community must be understood as a barrier mechanism against social deterioration, but not as an informal control, as this can lead to vigilantism and even lynching or people taking the law into their own hands. We are all part of the community, which does not mean that it is completely homogeneous or that the community as such should participate in all instances. In most of the experiences reviewed, the local community is called on to participate in the diagnosis and evaluations, principally by providing viewpoints on the security situation and describing the problems associated with this, which is known as consultative participation. Also, and most importantly, the community is the recipient of solution mechanisms and programmes offered (instrumental participation), but increasingly the solutions involve capacity-building and raising awareness in the community, which give it a less passive role and ensure a certain level of sustainability (participation with recognition, empowerment and social entitlement).

In the projects reviewed which included capacity-building or awareness-building workshops or bodies among their activities, the measured results and impacts on the community show changes in the perception of groups who saw themselves as different, an improvement in the perception of policing, a greater sense of belonging and solidarity; basically, a positive impact on the development of social capital. For example, the Safe Neighbourhoods Integrated Plan in Petaholón indicates among its results that ‘the neighbourhood security committees, together with the renovation of public spaces and the work done with young offenders are the areas that were most highly rated. This indicates that the programmes involving the most community participation and focused resources are, in general, the ones that have been best received in the community.’ The municipality of Paucarpata, in Peru, managed to break down the barriers between sectors where different gangs operate and achieved the free movement of the teenagers and young people that considered security to be the greatest problem, and it increased the number of crimes being reported and the use of the emergency network.

The reintegration project for young people in Mateare, Managua, managed to break down the barriers between the sectors where different gangs operate and achieved the free movement of the teenagers and young people that were helped. The Action on Line project, in São Paulo, accomplished greater police integration, got young people organised to replicate the project and caused a change of attitude among all the people involved, who began to see the matter (theft of cables) as a social problem and not as a conflict among private individuals.

Therefore, a good focus on preventing violence on a community level enables the following to be achieved: (i) identify strategies for the situational prevention of crime and violence which reduce the likelihood of criminal activity and (ii) develop preventive actions using a social focus that indicates the causes of crime and violence. Focusing on the community level can involve various stages, including: (i) community participation and organisation for successfully developing strategic associations; (ii) an evaluation to identify the principal problems of violence and crime in the community; (iii) developing a prevention strategy for the community; (iv) administration and implementation of the strategy; (v) establishment of coordination mechanisms with organisations of civil society; and (vi) monitoring and evaluation of the strategy. It should be highlighted that the stages presented here do not involve continued and dynamic action in which each one
constantly interacts with the others. The process is non-sequential and has greater chances of success when it is included in the activities of local institutions in a sustained manner.

This requires having the institutional capacity and established human capital on a local level in order to guarantee the sustainability of the interventions and coordination with other governmental bodies.

Along these lines, it is worth mentioning the experience of the Comuna Segura (‘Safe Commune’) programme in Chile (NB: communes in Chile are the smallest administrative subdivision), which later became known as the Plan Comunal de Seguridad Pública (‘Commune Plan for Public Security’), and which at the beginning had a mechanism for competitive grants to encourage community participation in managing projects to improve security. The design was based on having a mature and consolidated community — a condition that was not always met, which is why replicating the experiences in different contexts was not always feasible. Therefore, trying to pool community efforts on the basis of competitive grants was insufficient, which demonstrated the social organisations’ lack of capacity for generating projects and managing the resources correctly. After this experience, the format for community participation changed from it being the implementing body to focusing on consultation in diagnoses and, to a lesser extent, to facilitating the implementation.4

When social capital does not exist, or is weak, the ideal projects should focus on building this positive social capital, i.e., on fostering trust in institutions, a respect for the rules of peaceful coexistence, solidarity and a sense of belonging.

Another important element is coordination among different levels of government. Although problems of crime and violence are best tackled on a local scale, we must not overlook the fact that this is a global phenomenon which requires national support for police control actions and the criminal justice system. Good coordination involves the presence of police forces who work with communities to prevent violence and protect vulnerable populations, and a justice system that is accessible to all citizens, in particular the poorest, in order to help them resolve their conflicts peacefully, for example, by implementing alternative mechanisms of justice.

The analysis of the experiences rated as best practices, in which local government has played an important role (both in Latin America and other continents), focuses on a wide variety of areas including: interventions in education and schools; interventions with young people; family support; work with immigrants and indigenous peoples; measures of control; reintegration or rehabilitation; surveillance and public security and escorts; mediation/conflict resolution and reduction of violence; urban renovation/social urbanism; research or observatories; new community institutions; victim support; and integrated projects. The thematic distribution of the practices varies significantly in each of the territories identified; in Latin America they are distributed in the following way:

- Interventions with young people: 35.1%
- Interventions in education and schools: 16.2%
- Surveillance and public security and escorts: 11.3%
- Victim support: 12.9%
- Mediation/conflict resolution and reduction of violence: 11.3%
- New community institutions: 11.3%
- Interventions with young people: 9.7%

Specifically, the selection made by the CESC used the following criteria for determining the success of a particular practice: the level of impact achieved, the methodological innovation of the practices, the development of community relations, the quality and efficiency of the management, the level of leadership and empowerment obtained, the sustainability over time of the benefits achieved, the incorporation of criteria for differentiation and social inclusion and the attention paid to human rights. Despite having seven thematic categories defined in the first version of the contest,11 the winning practices only brought together three of them, with a clear predominance of projects aimed at prevention with young people. This should not be interpreted as implying that minors are the main instigators of violence and for that reason require greater attention, but rather that they are a group in which early


11. Prevention of problem behaviour related to crime or violence in children and teenagers; prevention of intrafamily violence and child abuse; community policing; situational prevention, multi-agency prevention; local promotion, dissemination and development; reconciliation, peaceful coexistence and reintegration in the context of armed conflict.
intervention in different ambits is possible (family, school, recreational, sporting, etc.) and with the possibility of making a big family and social impact.

Of the fifteen practices highlighted, seven were carried out in the municipality itself. In these cases, political will and a high level of support always stand out as a positive factor for implementing the practices. This has not only enabled these municipalities to position themselves in the community, but has also allowed the whole network of social support and protection institutions that they coordinate to find a different meaning in their work. Thus, health networks can detect cases of violence and know how to treat them and where to refer them to complement their intervention; the same applies to schools, the police and other social programmes. This is how community relations become meaningful and can be used in prevention on all levels (primary, secondary and tertiary).

This does not mean, however, that internal resistance is not sometimes felt from some areas that do not believe that citizen security is part of their job. It can also happen that an organisation that forms part of the network is overwhelmed with its own workload and therefore falls behind in its response to the others. This can be resolved by creating action protocols or signing agreements between the institutions involved, which also ensures a degree of sustainability for local coordination of the network. Likewise, it also seems necessary to raise local stakeholders’ awareness beforehand regarding the issues and problems of preventing crime and violence. To get all the relevant actors involved it is not necessary to securitize the municipality’s social agenda, but only to raise awareness and train these stakeholders so that, when they detect a problem involving violence, they can clearly see its impact and how it should be dealt with, as not all social problems involve crime or violence.

On the other hand, when the projects are external, developed by a different level of government or by non-governmental organisations, a prior stage of raising awareness is needed in the municipality to gain local acceptance for the intervention and the support of the local government. Municipal support for external organisations that want to work with the local population may involve: (1) facilitating physical spaces for running workshops, training courses and recreational activities; (2) providing information about the territory, the most critical places and the population distribution; and (3) providing a network of local contacts (police, health centres, schools, etc.). These are three forms of support between non-governmental organisations and municipalities that have been identified while reviewing crime prevention practices and which are considered successful. Although there may be projects that do not require any support from local governments, some kind of contact is seen as indispensable, as this enriches the knowledge that NGOs may have regarding the community and generates mechanisms of cooperation that make the projects more sustainable. There are some relatively successful projects in which the municipality does not have a clear role, but the ones that have had the greatest impact are those in which the municipality plays an important part.

One major difficulty concerns security in the local intervention (whether in projects run by the municipalities or not), given that many of the projects involve working in territories with high levels of victimisation. This is shown in some projects, such as the social reintegration programme in Mateare, Nicaragua; and Memoria Joven (Youth Memory), Unidades Móviles de Prevención (Mobile Prevention Units) and Fuerza Joven (Youth Force) in Colombia. Although insecurity and the presence of drug trafficking are the most obvious obstacles, particularly in the Colombian practices, they are present in any intervention in critical neighbourhoods. Therefore, the projects must consider collaborating with the police, not just to offer information or capacity-building for their professional teams, but also to provide security for the personnel and the local people involved in the projects, especially when these are young people who are trying to escape from the cycle of violence.

As this shows, there are no perfect types of intervention or a specific form of involving municipalities. It depends on factors such as the municipality’s legal authority to intervene in security matters (above all in its relationship with the police), on the human and financial resources available and, above all, on the political will of the authority to get involved and carry out projects in the area of crime prevention.

In some cases, the best way of working locally is to allow the municipality itself to act, while in others, certain outside agents (such as non-governmental or private organisations) are in a better position to execute the projects and can support weaker municipalities. For example, in Ecuador, although the responsibility for security lies with the national government, the municipality of Quito has developed its own citizen security policy, based on public participation, promoting citizen watchdog committees, professionalising the police and establishing policies to eradicate domestic and gender violence.12

As stakeholders in citizen security, local governments have done an important job in the last two decades, reaching places the central government cannot get to without the help of the municipalities. Municipalities’ level of autonomy for developing projects depends not only on their resources, but also on the leadership.

As previously mentioned, citizen security interventions, projects, policies and plans correspond to a series of areas that make up a security circuit, ranging from control and repression of crime to prevention in its various forms. Without doubt, the most widely-developed area in Latin America in recent decades has been prevention, as in the past the concept of security was unidirectional, i.e., the state focused mainly on repressing and punishing those who broke the law. This must also be seen within a context in which there were military governments and the dominant paradigm was national security. However, after the third wave of democracy, government authorities and civil organisations began to open up their discourse to new paradigms, such as those already mentioned on citizen, urban, democratic and human security.

This new outlook was also accompanied by institutional changes in different areas, such as the judiciary and the police. The complexity and multidimensionality of citizen security are reflected in a series of reforms, projects and interventions that demonstrate the progress made in the frameworks of interpretation, since, as we will see later, the obstacles are more closely related to problems of management than of comprehension or tackling the issue.

The progress in recognising the importance of a comprehensive and multidimensional overview of the problems of violence and criminality are particularly commendable in a continent where social protection and state capacity for dealing with social problems are limited. Although prevention has earned a place in the rhetoric of public policy, regrettably the theory is still far from being put into practice.

Changes in policing models

A large part of police resources are taken up by running costs and little is spent on investment; therefore, the bulk of the budget is earmarked for maintaining personnel and salaries. In many cases, despite increased budgets, the police have not been able to respond to the rise in violence and the impression has begun to spread that the police are completely overwhelmed by the situation. This is particularly true in contexts where organised crime is at war with the state, and the police, with their very limited resources, are fighting a completely unequal battle, as organised crime syndicates have far superior financial resources and weapons at their disposal.

Successful models promoted in Latin America include the Carabiniers in Chile and the National Police of Colombia – institutions that have achieved success in their work. Many police forces in Latin America have received training from and are following certain guidelines issued by the Carabiniers (especially in Colombia, Ecuador and the countries in Central America). However, the closed and centralised model of policing works in some countries, but not in others, depending on their institutional histories, the political-administrative organisation and the cultural context.
One interesting experience was the creation of the Mossos d’Esquadra in Catalonia, Spain. This police force was set up to take over most security matters within the autonomous region of Catalonia. Its creation led to the emergence of an autonomous region security agenda. It also involved a rethink of police work, which had to be adjusted to the situation that created it. This body carries out the functions of security police, criminal investigation department and administrative police, with officers completing a training period of almost two years.

On a local level, one of the main complaints made by the community and local governments themselves concerns the high turnover of police officers; although this may have strategic security reasons, the downside is that the police are no longer able to build long-lasting bonds of trust with the community they serve. Thus, models that rethink the role of the police from a local perspective should be studied in order to learn from their successes and mistakes.

In contrast, the creation of the National Civil Police (NCP) forces in Central America (inspired by the model of the Spanish Civil Guard) has not been an entirely successful process. In El Salvador, problems with bureaucracy and political will have limited the progress of the NCP, in addition to the presence of the old-style military logic (20% of the initial members of this new police body came from the old security forces; another 20%, from the FMLN; and the rest were civilians) which for a long time hindered the development of a united police body, although there is currently a process of incorporating community policing doctrines. El Salvador also has the Cuerpo de Agentes Municipales (Body of Municipal Agents - CAM), although their role is restricted to safeguarding public property, enforcing municipal bylaws and occasionally collaborating with the police.

On this last point, it should be mentioned that municipal resources tend to determine the existence of these police bodies which, however, are not all officially registered, as the NCP holds records on only six of these bodies, although in fact the indications are that there are many more.13 It would therefore be useful in the case of national and local police (or similar) coexisting, for a record to be made of all the security bodies in action and suitable protocols developed for governing their relationships, in order to avoid overlapping functions.

One experience that relates to the recent models of policing being promoted in Latin America is the Municipal Public Security Directorate in Chihuahua (DSPM), Mexico. Chihuahua was the first Mexican state to have an oral, public, accusatorial and transparent criminal procedure code (2007), which involved a transformation of the attorney system and the justice administration and new responsibilities for the municipal police.14 The DSPM had already started implementing some of the functions assigned to it in the 2007 reform, beginning in the mid-1980s with the establishment of a police training academy and continued at the beginning of the 1990s with a new police training system. However, it was in the year 2000 when the more profound changes to the model were initiated with the creation of a programme of proximity policing, accompanied by reforms that dignified police work and improved working conditions. Technology also began to be applied to analysing crime (such as Integrated Supervisory Statistical Zoning, or ZEUS). Today this police force combines the use of three models: proximity policing (which went from being an operational group to become community policing as an institutional model); problem-focused police (that can make decisions according to citizens’ needs); and police intelligence (which provides high-quality information).15

In any case, whether these models are centralised or decentralised, civil or military, the trend is for the police to become specialised in their different roles, thereby strengthening their specific capacities, for example, in the area of criminal investigation, antinarcotics and prevention, and, above all, fostering relationships with the community. In this regard, the strategic areas of analysis and criminal investigation must hold a central position in police organisations; otherwise, the main function expected of the police, and which is their exclusive responsibility, i.e., investigating crime, cannot be carried out with satisfactory levels of success, which would affect not only public perception, but also their relationship with judicial authorities.

An important premise for fostering social cohesion is that the police must build


14. It should be remembered that Mexico is divided into 32 federal states, in which the municipality is the basis of state administration; there are currently more than two thousand bodies of municipal officers.

relationships with the community; to achieve this it is important to develop models which also emphasise the police’s prevention job and their work with local governments.

The Federal Public Security Secretariat’s proposal to create a ‘New model of policing under single state control’ caused great tension in Mexico between two schemes: national police management and local police management. The content of this proposal has been criticised for not acknowledging the diversity of municipal police bodies and assuming the superiority of the federal police, when what is needed is to create a new model of policing that respects the differences and different levels of government.16

In a national police system, in small and highly centralised states this can require a paradigm shift in order for the police to switch to a model of community outreach, and for protocols of understanding to be developed with the municipalities that do not have authority over the police, to facilitate joint working with local governments. In states where the local level is the basis of organisation, municipal police bodies should be professionalised and a model of preventive policing introduced which recognises the conditions and needs that must be addressed and considered from a municipal point of view, thus reconfiguring the relationship between citizens and the police.

New models of justice administration

The judicial system is another fundamental pillar of the security circuit which carries out three functions: it prevents private conflicts being resolved in private and through acts of vengeance; it serves as a mediator in the state’s prosecution of crime; and it becomes an institutional means of redressing violence and criminal offences.17 On this matter, at least three forms of justice administration in this setting must be mentioned: restorative justice, mediation and the installation of adversarial criminal proceedings.

In a restorative justice model, the objective is not limited to simply punishing the perpetrator, but rather, appealing to a more comprehensive framework, it focuses on re-establishing social ties so that both the victim and the perpetrator participate in redressing the situation. The aim is to make this a forward-looking process (repairing forward) and not only to punish actions that occurred in the past. In this area, the Tierra de Hombres Foundation in Peru has promoted the creation of a model of restorative justice, specifically in the area of juvenile justice, achieving noteworthy results such as reducing the violation of rights during the police phase, decreasing the number of prosecutions of many young people in detention, increasing socio-educational measures instead of punitive measures, increasing family presence when police statements are taken, involving the victim in the process, reducing the recurrence rate and specialising the police role in interventions with young offenders, among others.18

Justice mediation is also another way of resolving conflicts that may provide solutions without the need to refer cases to the courts, and thus contributing to unblocking the judicial system. It is a model for managing conflicts which people can resort to freely in order to resolve their disputes. Mediation is a direct assistance alternative that involves the victim and the offender in the process of redressing the offence. It is a social alternative that provides the offender with an opportunity to resolve their conflict with the community. It is a very useful model in the community sphere for resolving problems of citizen coexistence. For example, an office can be set up to receive complaints made by members of the public without the need to take matters to court.

Chile is another frequently mentioned case due to the criminal procedure reform it launched in the year 2000 and which introduced a new model of administration with the creation of the Department of Public Prosecution and the public counsel for the defence, with different systems of administration and organisation. This reform was introduced gradually, which allowed the system and human resources to be adjusted to meet the needs of each region of the country. On the one hand, the annual response capacity increased notably, with a strong impact on the reduction of the number of people held in custody awaiting trial and multiplying the number of criminal convictions by six, which soared from 35,000 in 1999 to 215,000 in 2008. However, on the other hand, it should be mentioned that this reform was not accompanied by a suitable criminal and penitentiary policy, as the rate of imprisonment rose from 220 to 318 people per 100,000 inhabitants between 2000 and 2009.19 Alternative punishments became relegated to one side, not only


18. For further details please see: <www.justiciaparacrecer.org>

due to lack of infrastructure, financial and human resources, but also by the judicial system itself, which did not take these alternatives into consideration because of a lack of confidence that the punishments would be served.

The present state of justice administration shows that a more integrated relationship still needs to be developed between criminal law and criminal procedures, which requires resources to be assigned for investigation that supports the work of judges. Ministries and public defenders require ongoing efforts to meet growing demands to improve their capacities and response times, as the judicial system is one of the least trusted by the public. This lack of trust can contribute to reducing the amount of crimes being reported and encourage people to take the law into their own hands. Perhaps one way to bring the justice system closer to the public is to set up offices or centres where primary assistance may be able to respond to victims demands and needs in a more interdisciplinary way, with higher quality and on various levels: publicising and promoting rights, and providing immediate protection and assistance as well as fast solutions.

For example, in Cuenca, Ecuador, the Department of Public Prosecution, the judiciary, the public counsel for the defence and free citizens’ advice services have been trying since 2006 to increase productivity in the criminal justice system. Since 2003, they have implemented oral remand hearings, which have enabled the number of cases resolved with non-custodial sentences to be increased. They also introduced the Department of Public Prosecution primary assistance unit, which is in charge of filtering cases and only passing those that can be investigated on to prosecutors. This mechanism was introduced using an exchange of information between the judiciary, the Department of Public Prosecution, the Civil Registry, the Land Registry, the criminal investigation department and rehabilitation centres. As part of the process teachers also received training on oral litigation methodology. This model of administration increased public confidence and the credibility of the justice system, turning it into the second most trusted institution after the church.


21. Ibid.

Penal populism and prison crisis

The judicial area is followed by the prison system, which generally tends to be less visible as elections are not won by promoting prison policies and humanitarian conditions, and nobody wants to live near a prison. Added to the scarcity of cases of successful reintegration into society, the result is limited dissemination of positive experiences and best practices. This area is usually best known for internal violence and high levels of corruption, rather than any positive achievements.

A well-known example in the region is Chile’s licensed prison system, in which public tenders are offered to the private sector for building and servicing prisons, but custody of prisoners remains the responsibility of the police.

This model has enabled more modern prisons with proper security criteria to be built, perhaps more quickly than would have been the case if the state had built them itself. However, this system has not been accompanied by the closure of older centres that no longer meet minimum standards of security, hygiene and space. Neither does the system offer the supposed advantage of reducing costs, as it has led to the state having to pay millions in fines as the licensing contract stipulates that fines must be paid for each inmate that exceeds the specified quota for each prison.

This last point highlights a very important issue for the entire security system, but particularly for the prison and justice systems: until there is a criminal policy that favours reintegration and restoration over punishment, criminal prosecution systems will continue to be overwhelmed and no policy or programme will be able to reverse the crisis they find themselves in.

What is known as penal populism is another of the prevalent trends, but one with a clearly negative outcome. A good example of the application of these types of measures is the development of ‘three strikes’ laws in the United States. These arose in response to a public perception that the justice system was incapable of protecting the community from violent crime and that tougher measures were needed to correct the situation.

The aim of these laws was basically to introduce tougher punishments for re-offenders by sending them to prison, making sentences longer and reducing their chance of parole. However, various studies indicated that these laws were not having the expected impact, as many of the offenders that were imprisoned were being replaced by others ready to commit the same crimes or that they had failed to identify the potential group.

The case of Brazil’s toughening up of its stance on crime is also a good example of how these types of measures need to be very carefully applied. The Law 8072/90, which mainly covers aggravated criminal offences, stipulates that those convicted of homicide, extortion,
extortion by kidnapping, rape and violent indecent assault, may not receive a pardon, amnesty or reprieve, and sets the minimum sentence that must be served—which is increased in the case of re-offenders—and states that those charged must be held in maximum security prisons.

Some studies on this matter indicate that the policies of mass incarceration brought about by this law did not result in a reduction of crime, and even less in the crimes it specifically mentioned, but in fact it led to a disproportionate increase in prison populations.22

**Private circles of violence**

Another central area in citizen security interventions which has taken on great importance in the last decade is linked to gender violence and intrafamily violence in general. Due to the fact that this type of violence mainly occurs behind closed doors it remained invisible for decades until it began to be recognised that private violence also has a public side to it, due to the crimes it leads to (injuries, rapes, murders) and its influence on the development of violent behaviour, especially in minors who witness these acts. In this respect, one interesting measure is the introduction of police stations dedicated exclusively to this area of crime.

In 1994, the first intrafamily violence police station was created in Guayaquil, Ecuador and, influenced by women’s movements, a law against intrafamily violence was later passed. This type of specialised police station has been replicated across Latin America because of its positive impact on encouraging these crimes to be reported and on raising awareness of the issue. Other experiences are linked to local governments, such as, for example, the metropolitan network for assistance and prevention of domestic and gender violence in Quito which backed the creation of the Commission for Women and the Family in the Metropolitan District, which in turn issued a municipal bylaw that recognised this type of violence as a problem for the district to deal with and thereby ensuring that resources were allocated to address the issue.23 This is a solution that yielded results in a specific context, as municipal bylaws can have different impacts depending on the legal system that accompanies them. In Ecuador, the specialised women and family police stations were not part of the judicial system until the new Constitution of 2008 made them into intrafamily violence courts.

Because this is a matter that victims may wait a long time before reporting to the police and because there are high levels of impunity, most of the debate and efforts by networks seeking to eradicate gender and intrafamily violence have taken place in the legal field, with the aim of criminalising these acts or of increasing the penalties for crimes related to intrafamily violence. Although it is true that criminalising these offences can create a new framework for more specific action, the impact will be limited if it is not accompanied by preventive and awareness programmes and by treating the aggressors. In the case of the latter, it is necessary for health centres and psychosocial and educational support organisations to work together on a local level and that they are suitably trained and sensitised to deal with this issue.

**Privatisation of security**

One recent very important trend that has been seen in Latin America is the privatisation of security, connected with two issues that affect social cohesion: a strong perception of insecurity and distrust of the police. The growth of this trend can be explained by the gap that exists between the public’s high demand for security and the actual ability of the state to provide this through its security bodies. Thus, the state has a limited capacity to handle citizens’ multiple demands which are fuelled by their strong perception of insecurity. A lack of budget, of strategies for tackling new crimes and of modernisation of the public control system (police and prisons) has led to the development of the private security industry. In certain cases, the public’s lack of faith in both the police and the justice system, as well as inequality in the distribution of wealth, are also factors that influence the demand for private security services. Even when all these are factors that could affect the installation and growth of this industry, it has not been confirmed that there is a clear influence in this regard, as there are no statistics that prove this. For example, data from Chile shows that between 2005 and 2007 levels of victimisation remained the same, the perception of insecurity fell and the private security industry grew.

One of the reasons for the growth of private security is the transfer of authority over citizen security from the public sector to the private sector, making the police just one of many actors. However, this expansion should not be viewed as a matter of privatisation, in the sense of a voluntary transfer, but rather it is the result of the gap between the public’s security expectations and their perception of the level of security the police force is able to provide.

The growth of this industry has been rather unstructured and accompanied by highly dispersed rules and a lack of regulation in various areas, which highlights the need for a greater knowledge, legislation and development of this industry. Proper attention would help ensure that private security...
Private security lies in the sphere of preventive social control, which is composed of interventions not based on criminal prosecution but focused on the causes leading to crime, and which aims to reduce the risk or likelihood of suffering damage or harm. Private security is almost exclusively preventive. In contrast to police forces—which are responsible for both preventing and controlling crime—, private security exists to a great extent to prevent and raise the alert when crimes against property are committed.25 Public security, as well as defending the nation, is a public asset and a collective right; in theory, it is neither exclusive nor excluding, but when security becomes a service available on the market, it creates a new factor of inequality between those who can afford to pay for their security and those who cannot. Some definitions emphasise the democratic and solidary aspect of security: ‘this democratic concept of citizen security has a civic and solidary dimension that determines this character of a collective asset; thus, security must be understood as everybody’s job, as we are part of the same community working together on a common project. In addition, this concept assumes that we understand violence as a social phenomenon, directly related to social structure and culture as a value system.’26

Today, however, this solidary dimension has lost momentum in a society that places the emphasis on the individual, who, not having their multiple security demands satisfactorily met, invest in it themselves by hiring security guards and installing technology for their own protection, or the protection of neighbourhoods, businesses, private homes and property, with access to and regulation of this sector left to the rules of the market.

Another factor that is likely to have encouraged the spread of private security is related to the characteristics of this labour market, which is dominated by informality and rapid turnover. In the case of Chile, many security service companies have emerged that employ a large number of people. This is reflected in the 19,015 security guards that were directly employed by companies in 2007, and the 73,849 that worked for human resources companies (as guards and watchmen) where there is also a high turnover of staff: 47 percent of the companies have a turnover rate of over 70 percent.24 There are more than 1,000 companies authorized to operate as human resource service providers; almost half of them (46 percent) are located in the Metropolitan Region, and 82 percent of those registered with the Sub-directorate of Carabiniers Private Security are exclusively dedicated to providing human resources, i.e., security guard services, thus avoiding the breakup of their offer.

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Security and social cohesion are two interlinked concepts and social states. Despite this, their relationship has so far only been conceptually explored and politically exploited very superficially. From a conceptual point of view, both ideas share two central characteristics: they are neither univocal nor static. Socially, they are attributes of a collective order (a cohesive society, a safe society) which also have profound consequences in individual terms. These global states are the result of a complex combination of multiple factors (including sectorial public policies) over which governments have an unequal capacity of influence. They are also the objectives of public policy and play a role (more or less prominent, depending on the case) in the political agenda and public policy in the different levels of government.

However, the concept of social cohesion is much wider than that of security. Likewise, the notion of social cohesion is hierarchically superior to that of security: a cohesive society facilitates obtaining high levels of security. Moreover, citizen security is a key component of a cohesive society. Several analysts and stakeholders have stressed the attributes of social cohesion. Disregarding minor differences, there is a consensus in the literature on its defining features: a sense of community, similar life opportunities, respect for diversity, political trust and a sense of belonging. All of these are linked to public perceptions which, without doubt, are equated with possible expectations or desires to live better in a community.

A key element that is found in each and every one of the attributes mentioned

27. The URB-AL III Programme Orientation and Coordination Office adopted the following definition of social cohesion: A socially cohesive community on any scale, whether local, regional or national, depends on its members sharing a sense of inclusion and belonging, participating actively in public affairs, recognising and tolerating differences and enjoying a degree of equality in access to public goods and services and the distribution of income and wealth. All of this should take place in an environment where institutions generate confidence and legitimacy and where the rights of citizenship are fully exercised.’ (URB-AL III OCO, 2010).

above is institutional and interpersonal trust. Societies in which distrust dominates cannot develop high levels of social cohesion. On the contrary, they fall further into fragmentation and stigmatisation. In fact, in a classic text on the subject of trust, Uslaner said that trust was the ‘chicken soup of social life’ and, therefore, countries with high levels of trust have governments that work better, more distributive policies, markets that are more open and less corruption, so that they particularly stand out for their level of economic equality.

The link between trust and crime levels has been analysed by various authors, who agree that higher levels of trust generally go hand-in-hand with lower levels of crime. Thus, for example, in a study carried out in the United States, a clear correlation was shown between high levels of social trust and low homicide rates. In a comparative study of regions carried out by the Pew Research Centre, it was found that in countries with a higher level of social trust there was a lower percentage of the population that considered crime to be a serious problem.

In Latin America, studies that link trust and crime are very limited, and have a more descriptive than inferential character. In any case, the information revealed shows high levels of distrust of the government. According to data from 2010, the countries in the region showed worrying figures, with citizens that simply distrusted their governments.

Distrust of the government in general becomes more complex when questions are asked about the perception of justice. It is worrying to note that we live on a continent in which citizens do not trust the justice system; they probably feel that justice is not administered fairly and they associate it with corruption or high levels of inefficiency.

According to some analysts (for example, Chanley, Rudolph and Rahn, 2000), crime has an impact on citizen trust in the government. In addition to this, crime (and the perception of crime) has a clear effect on the design and implementation of public policies on security. Likewise, confidence in the police and their effective democratic control are two key variables for successfully implementing these policies. To put it another way, the absence of citizen trust in public institutions is one of the elements that affects crime rates and levels of fear, because when citizens have no faith in the institution responsible for controlling crime, they experience a greater feeling of insecurity. This situation is magnified when the degree of public distrust includes both representative institutions and agencies in charge of ensuring security. As shown in chart 5, the data in Latin America is irrefutable: a high percentage of citizens support non-democratic operations in order to solve the problem of crime. This situation once again highlights the debate between security and liberty, as there is a high percentage of people who would consider the real possibility of restricting liberties if it meant improving indicators of security. This is undoubtedly a global tragedy that we are already experiencing.

However, distrust also affects the way in which we build institutional and personal links, and our feelings of insecurity. Citizens with lower levels of trust in their peers show higher levels of fear, and this is connected to social cohesion. Thus, in a seminal study by Sampson and Groves, it was shown that community cohesion is directly related to the reduction of street crime and violence by strangers. Likewise, Hirschfield and Bowers, concluded that if crime levels drop, social cohesion increases; and in a more recent study, Lee states that the stronger the feeling of community, the lower the level of crime.

On this point, the Latin-American situation is far from acceptable since, as shown in chart 6, the percentage of those interviewed who did not trust others is alarmingly high, in almost all cases exceeding 70% of the total and with little variation in recent years.

As previously mentioned, a society in which distrust reigned is a society in which there are not only high levels of fear, but it is also a society in which social bonds are weak, and in which distrust, fragmentation and exclusion are intensified. All of this affects the possibility of creating a common project in the future.

Therefore, the fight against distrust should be placed at the forefront of the agenda of political challenges if we want to increase and improve social cohesion in Latin America. This requires policy initiatives linked to an increase in efficiency and transparency in government action, which, in the area of security, points directly to the police and the justice system. Additionally, long-term initiatives are also needed to promote public cooperation, exchange and the use of public spaces, which will in turn lead to cultural changes and the perception of the effectiveness, need and importance of community participation. Without doubt, this challenge is beyond the existing capacities of certain sectors or levels of government, which means that it is necessary to fully involve the state in effectively linking and coordinating initiatives.

Differentiation in the action of public policy

Although related, the guidelines for public actions to generate social cohesion and security are different. For example, policies that aim to boost levels of cohesion do not focus on a specific population. On the contrary, they are of a more universal nature as they seek objectives in society as a whole. Policies of cohesion could be described as being connected with citizens’ quality of life rather than with the specific goal of sectorial targets.

Experience of public security interventions demonstrates the need for policies focused on populations at risk of embarking on criminal careers, or on victimised populations with high levels of fear. Focusing initiatives is a necessary and increasingly important element for making an impact on and changes to daily living conditions. Thus, although there are global objectives (linked to increasing trust, participation and social integration), security policies are developing with specific designs that should enable more obvious progress to be made.

Security without social cohesion is possible, but not desirable. A society can define security mechanisms that include high levels of segregation, social-territorial fragmentation and even the use of force, but none of these elements generates cohesion. The discourse on security is often based on social differentiation, identifying the enemy to be corrected, imprisoned or healed (depending on the type of intervention) and the proposal of individualistic public policies.

From firm hand to social cohesion

Beyond the conceptual difficulties regarding the paradigm of security with social cohesion or social cohesion with security, it is necessary to continue promoting public policy initiatives that identify possible spaces of interaction, cooperation and focalisation, whose aim is social cohesion within the framework of the rule of law. In this section, the diverse efforts made by public policy over recent years are presented, with particular attention paid to change in the political discourse and the development of a political language which started with ‘firm hand’ initiatives, zero tolerance and more severe punishment, with ‘firm hand’ initiatives, zero tolerance and more severe punishment, and which currently includes objectives on justice, inclusion, prevention and cohesion.

Forms of public intervention in security matters have changed in the past two decades. Although it is difficult...
to establish a homogeneous line of development marked with clear milestones of change, it is possible to follow the path along which some types of political action have been built.

As discussed in the first section, in the early 1990s almost all the countries in the region focused mainly on policies to control crime. These policies—also known as ‘firm hand’ initiatives—fulfilled a central role in a context of high politicalisation of the problem due to the rise in insecurity, the apparent governmental inefficiency in dealing with it and public demands for fast and effective policies. The ‘firm hand’ and ‘super firm hand’ policies proposed in some countries in Central America are an example of this situation in a context worsened by the presence of youth gangs known as maras. At the time it was thought that the necessary reforms of the justice system and the police were essential steps towards creating a mindset of efficient institutional intervention. Likewise, laws were passed which increased the punishments for emerging criminal acts (maras, gangs, cybercrime, bullying, etc.) and in most of the countries the age of legal responsibility was lowered. The main actor in this legal framework was the national government, which continued with macro-reforms designed to reduce ‘incentives’ that may lead to the development of criminal careers.

Public investment in these measures has been significant. More than thirteen countries have undertaken processes of reforming criminal procedures, accompanied by an important fiscal investment. Practically all of the police forces in the region have seen an increase in their resources, renovation of infrastructures and technological development, among other actions. The prison systems are in crisis as a result of severe overcrowding that has limited their internal governability and has worsened levels of violence. As no money had been spent on the prison systems, bringing these up-to-date would require an important investment by the state.

This investment has not improved the problem of insecurity. On the contrary, the indicators show worsening violence, a population living in a state of fear, police corruption, a sluggish judicial system and the presence of organised crime.

This crisis situation, combined with governments powerless to halt emerging types of crime, the presence of international organisations that placed the emphasis on different perspectives and international experience, among other factors, permitted a change or, rather, a complementation in the paradigm of political action. From this emerged the discourse of security as an integrated phenomenon that requires the participation of all levels of the state and citizens to design more effective initiatives. The slogan heard in many countries, which states that security is everybody’s job, has become established at the heart of political action, accompanied by a rise in the number of crime prevention programmes (mainly situational) and in the development of community policing and neighbourhood organisation programmes.

Nevertheless, this paradigm is more firmly established in public discourse than in the actual practice of public policy. In fact, a review of public spending indicates that crime prevention programmes are still very limited compared with those linked to control bodies. However, it is in local governments’ field of action that this perspective takes on a particularly important aspect. The mayors of large and medium-sized cities across Latin America recognised the need to act on the problem of insecurity (even without having the financial, technical or even legal capacity) and they run civic organisation initiatives (panic buttons, self-protection systems, community surveillance and social collaboration actions), as well as deterrent programmes (surveillance, local security patrols, and coordination with the police). In addition, the various levels of government have designed strategies for the social prevention of crime (in many cases supported or run by non-governmental organisations) which, in a sporadic and unsustainable way, work with populations considered to be at risk. During this learning stage, many initiatives were carried out that had little to do with actual security objectives but which instead highlighted the need for quality of life programmes, building bonds between neighbours and social organisations for stronger cohesion. This is how security became almost the principal objective of any national and local development policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Firm hand (internal security)</th>
<th>Integrated security (citizen security)</th>
<th>Social cohesion</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focused on punishment</td>
<td>Recognition of the importance of prevention</td>
<td>Still under debate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime as an individual action</td>
<td>Limited investment</td>
<td>Initially developed by international cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional response centred on criminal justice</td>
<td>More centred on discourse than action</td>
<td>Specific intervention unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen response (skirt/tail)</td>
<td>Participation of local governments</td>
<td>Includes structural issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electorally viable</td>
<td>Citizens as stakeholders</td>
<td>Universal and sectorial interaction policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited impact</td>
<td>Difficult to target</td>
<td>Inclusion, social legitimacy and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High visibility</td>
<td>Complex combination with control policies</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Focused on national governments</td>
<td>Re-socialisation still invisible</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Referenced social factors</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>De-radicalisation</td>
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</table>

Table 2: Paradigms of political action on security issues

Source: prepared by the author.
The results are not encouraging, however. The call for public participation without real financing and sustainability has had unexpected results, with citizens demanding harsher punishments, police presence and control. The prevention programmes carried out have not been evaluated and, therefore, there is no real data regarding their impact on the problem of insecurity. Crime and violence indicators remain high, organised crime persists in a worrying way in the region and the principal risk factors of criminal activity, indicated in the research and specialised literature, have not varied significantly.

The list of factors linked to the development of insecurity ranges from individual situations (consumption of alcohol and drugs, presence of intrafamily violence, lack of education, mental health problems, labour disabilities) to contextual situations (social-territorial segregation, ghettos of vulnerability, exclusion of young people, violent peer group), and to structural situations (inequality, exclusion, distrust and lack of state legitimacy).

This situation creates a highly complex framework for political action. The previous paradigms placed the emphasis on the need for a new form of social bonding that defined its investment, action and political priorities. This is how the political agenda on social cohesion developed over recent years has become an excellent frame of reference for citizen security policies. The fundamental elements that characterise a cohesive society cannot be assured in a context marked by insecurity and violence.

Preventive actions are those which are more directly related to consolidating the various elements of social cohesion. That is why it is necessary to differentiate between the various types of prevention according to their objectives (social, community and situational prevention), and also depending on the beneficiaries (primary, secondary and tertiary prevention). When seen in this way, most of the initiatives implemented on a local level, especially those involving primary and secondary prevention, display an important synergy with more comprehensive or structural policies.

There is certainly a long way to go towards consolidating policies that address inclusion, participation, acceptance of differences and political legitimacy. The paradigm of social cohesion seems in theory to be an excellent way of understanding and proposing social change, even if practical initiatives that make real progress towards achieving these objectives are only infrequently proposed. However, we can detail some of the key characteristics of these interventions which call for, firstly, decentralised action procedures in which various levels of government effectively coordinate their objectives and, secondly, strategies for aligning the initiatives underway. Likewise, from this perspective of understanding and political action the emphasis is placed on concerns about quality of life rather than the exclusive needs of the sector, which means that inclusion, social legitimacy and development become key concepts and central objectives in the medium term. Finally, this paradigm has been promoted with special interest through international cooperation (in particular European), which recognises the problems of the previous paradigms and proposes a more holistic view of the phenomenon.36 The following section takes a more in-depth look at some experiences that highlight the intervention areas developed in Latin America; these experiences are considered to be promising in specialised research.

Experiences and evidence

The progress made in implementing citizen security programmes and policies in their various dimensions is undeniable. As previously mentioned, there has been a shift away from a model centred on repressive action by the state to a more holistic and multidisciplinary approach. National governments are increasingly

36. It should be mentioned that the diagnosis of citizen security interventions in many European cities is not that different to Latin America.
favouring collaboration with civil society and local governments. Evidence of this can be found in the Fica Vivo (‘Stay Alive’) and Luta pela Paz (‘Fight for Peace’) programmes, which, through social and educational support, promoting recreational activities, sport and health, have managed to reduce the number of homicides involving young people in Brazil. Another example comes from Chile, with its Commune Plans for Public Security (previously known as Safe Commune), one of whose strong-points is the work done on a local level with young people at risk, building networks to train them as cadets in the firefighter’s academy (San Pedro de la Paz, in Concepción), for example, or teaching them rowing in a school specialised in this sport (Valdivia). Initiatives like these have helped to reduce drug-taking and school drop-outs, while also increasing integration and community commitment.

Police institutions have also taken up the challenge of improving their ties with citizens, as well as launching initiatives focused on prevention. The justice systems acknowledge the need to stop the development of criminal careers using alternatives to imprisonment, and even hear cases before they come to court. One successful experience in this area is the Community Board for Urban Security (previously known as Safe Commune) for local interests.

On the other hand, cases like the Jamadi Centre, in the municipality of Huimilpán, in Mexico, which works with at-risk sectors and provides legal advice for victims, demonstrate the link between police and citizens, but also the progress that has been made in supporting victims and providing legal defence for alleged offenders, elements that we must recognise as part of the improvements seen in the past two decades.

All of these are advances in governing the sector that have enabled the definition of medium-term economic, social and institutional development objectives that include citizens. Nevertheless, the improvements are scarce and there is room for many other possible enhancements, as there are best practices in European countries that could be applied in Latin America. Although the contexts are different in terms of violence and crime, it must be recognised that if what is being sought is governance and social cohesion, then there are replicable practices that motivate and involve more social actors in these initiatives.

One example of these is the German programme Fairy Godmother, which helps increase children’s safety and reduce parents’ concerns thanks to the support of local businesses which take children in and attend to any small injuries they have, let them use a telephone to call home or allow them to wash their hands. Another example is the escort programme for people using the streets late at night in France, called Correspondants de nuit (‘Night correspondents’). Likewise, the first phase of the Fortalecimiento Institucional en el Área Metropolitana de San Salvador para la Cohesión Social y la Seguridad Ciudadana (‘Institutional Reinforcement in the Metropolitan Area of San Salvador for Social Cohesion and Citizen Security’) project aims to strengthen the social fabric of both the municipal and metropolitan area by promoting territorial and sectorial organisation, supporting the prevention of violence, social cohesion and citizen security, and prioritising a gender-based strategy aimed at childhood and youth in the metropolitan area of San Salvador.

Most of these experiences in citizen security are an implicit contribution towards social cohesion. Many projects focus on the young population, specifically minors, and seek to strengthen their sense of belonging to their communities, to develop a respect for the rules of peaceful social coexistence and, above all, for social capital. Another important area is linked to promoting the ownership of rights in minors, with the aim of reducing the segregation and marginalisation of this group in critical neighbourhoods. In one of the most holistic approaches, another contribution local security initiatives make to social cohesion is the promotion of collaborative networks as mechanisms of social protection, in which victims and perpetrators can find integrated help to break the cycle of violence. Finally, many of the initiatives that have been developed aim to foster citizens’ trust in institutions, which improves the position of the police and local governments (see appendix).

Thus, it is clear that the outstanding challenges are monumental. Firstly, a better understanding of the local situation must be gained in order to make political decisions directly and efficiently. Some cities, such as Bogotá and Quito, have set up observatories which produce information on the phenomena of violence and crime, but these are still only tentative steps towards defining genuine information systems. In most cases there are no national systems for producing rigorous and up-to-date information. This situation even has an effect on regional and sub-regional initiatives of systematising crime data.37

Secondly, the concentration of public investment has not been to the benefit of measures particularly linked to control, and investment in effective prevention is very limited, and less still with regards social reintegration. Suitable studies that demonstrate the impact of these initiatives could reinforce political investment decisions, which are fairly absent in the region today. Thirdly, national governments’ experiences are

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37. Some examples are the Inter-American Observatory on Security of the OAS <www.oas.org/dsp/english/cpo_observatorio.asp> and the Observatory on Central America (OCAVI) <www.ocavi.com>. For a list of initiatives on this matter see: www.crime-prevention-intl.org/uploads/media/Repertorio_internacional_de_observatorios_de_la_delincuencia.pdf>
The progress made in interpreting conceptual frameworks, as mentioned in the previous sections, unfortunately has not been accompanied by a corresponding development of management capacities (in various levels of government) which encourage the implementation of integrated policies. This can be seen in the great diversity of citizen security interventions, with mixed results, whose success is also determined by equally diverse factors.

Because citizen security relies on a network of different stakeholders (community, justice systems, police, municipalities, care workers, etc.) and on interventions at different levels (national, regional or state, provincial and municipal), the successful management of its projects, plans and programmes is determined by the level of these stakeholders’ commitment to and understanding of the problem. The latter requires understanding that the stakeholders involved should work in coordination and share common parameters regarding the phenomenon. This is particularly relevant when there are substantial differences between national and local policies. Although local governments have their legitimate differences and diverse needs in terms of their specific context, there should be a shared pattern governing the aims and principles that guide them. It is positive, for example, to have an agreement between the national and local level when following one citizen security policy and not another, and when preventing crime is as important as controlling it.

This agreement enables intentions and resources to be united towards achieving the same objective

The most common problem in managing citizen security is the emphasis placed on effectiveness over efficiency, i.e., there is a preference for presenting more results linked to achieving goals and objectives than the ratio of resources to accomplishments. This means, among other things, that systems of measuring success focus on coverage results (number of actions carried out, quantity of beneficiaries helped, etc.) and pay less attention to the resources used to achieve these results and the social impact of these interventions. This is particularly important if the project’s objectives focus on increasing social cohesion, in which case qualitative instruments are required so that any changes that occur in terms of generating social capital, building stronger bonds of solidarity among the community and respect for the rules of coexistence can be identified.

The widely referenced local best practices on crime prevention have not been evaluated in enough detail to be able to identify the specific determining elements for reducing crime (especially in the cases of Bogotá and Medellín). However, they do demonstrate the need to redesign a key role for local government as the coordinator of prevention measures (community, social and situational). The best practices in crime prevention referred to in many research texts and specialised literature are still very often sporadic, anecdotal initiatives with a rather limited
impact, but this does not detract from their performance; on the contrary, their recognition suggests the need to move forward with the community following a solid work agenda for developing long-term initiatives with greater coverage and clear impact.

The analysis of these practices shows that they have a clear thematic and programmatic direction, but that management capacities are a barrier—in some cases insuperable—to their successful implementation. On this point, it is worth mentioning that this is not necessarily a problem of funding, as prioritising security has in many contexts justified budget increases, changes of funding and thematic redefinitions. It is clear then that the emphasis should be placed on providing better technical capacities and sustained support for key initiatives in order to improve the prevention and control of violence and crime.

To improve the management of citizen security and in the framework of this approach, investment must be made in qualified human resources, which involves hiring professionals and experts with the right profile for running projects with the community. These expert and proactive teams should be guided by a leader with a clear vision of public security, i.e., someone who knows what they want to achieve in security terms, and is able to transmit this to his or her team. A good example of this was the leadership of Mayor Antanas Mockus, in Bogotá, who efficiently managed very close communication with citizens.

In this case, this vision was combined with a leader committed to the issue, and his successors maintained the same approach. On other occasions, the vision can come from a national policy, such as in the case of the National Policy on Public Security in Chile, which through the Safe Commune programme helped to progressively establish security in the municipalities. The adoption of a shared vision allows a pooling of resources and the community around a single policy, but for this to be successfully managed a technical coordinator is required whose role is fundamental for the operation of the projects and teams. One aspect to bear in mind is that working with the community can be very difficult in critical neighbourhoods or communities, where drug trafficking is present and there is little positive social capital. In these cases, other ways of carrying out the diagnosis and gradually approaching the community should be sought.

Together with setting up work teams, it is also necessary to run suitable analyses which form a basic instrument for planning any strategy or policy and deciding which projects are more necessary according to the situation indicated by the results of these analyses.

This tool is also the first step towards obtaining information about the situation to be addressed and provides the basis for future feedback on the projects. After the interventions have finished, indicators similar to those in the diagnosis can be used to detect the changes that have occurred. According to the information we have on successful practices, we can see that they respond adequately to part of the problem detected in the analyses, and, without doubt, a project should limit its intervention to one problem and cannot attempt to provide a permanent solution to all the problems revealed in the diagnosis stage.

Analyses, just like the evaluations, can take different forms and involve different tools, and may include expert opinions, collections of quantitative data and the application of qualitative instruments, but something they always have in common is an instrumental and descriptive value.

We must not forget that analyses should be participative, meaning that they should include the community, thus enabling information to be gathered regarding citizens’ perceptions and their assessment of the problems of security – data which is very useful for identifying the places that provoke the greatest insecurity. Among the practices used in this regard are what are known as exploratory walks, in which the community participates on the ground identifying the most dangerous places or those in which they feel most insecure.

Successful management also requires the development of follow-up, monitoring and evaluation systems, which provide the work teams with access to the same information for measuring the overall results and impacts. Finally, procedures must be standardised to avoid discretion being used in their execution and activities being brought to a standstill when work teams are changed over.

Sustainability is also an important factor in determining whether a citizen security project has been successfully managed or not, as when resources are only available for very short periods (one or two years), it is impossible to ensure positive impacts in highly complex interventions, such as those dealing with intrafamily violence, young offenders, school violence and rehabilitation and reintegration. A strategy that can undoubtedly help to achieve sustainable policies is negotiation with local stakeholders and forming associations with key social organisations in local action, such as the police, municipal departments and those associations based in the municipality, because it can be more difficult to reach the community with external organisations.

As previously mentioned, projects that are carried out by municipalities in most cases have institutional support and leadership, which would be more difficult to achieve in the case of external organisations,
but which is nevertheless indispensable for ensuring good management. When strategic planning involves collaboration between governmental and non-governmental organisations it ensures that common goals are set. This allows shared management areas to be built, in which the governmental actor can contribute with resources and dissemination, while external stakeholders collaborate their experience and expert teams. Whatever alternative is chosen, in order to successfully manage the projects those chosen must fit the objectives and the diagnosis. After this, there should be a clear and realistic plan of activities, resources and timescales for executing the project.

Even if there is good planning of resources, objectives and activities, it is not possible to ensure successful management if the work teams are not well formed. In some of the practices reviewed we have found that coordinators were on the same level as the project assistants in the organisational chart, when in fact coordinators should have a central role and the assistants and experts who implement the projects should report to them in order to avoid overlapping functions. This type of structure is seen in projects like Memoria Joven (‘Youth Memory’), in Medellín, Colombia, and Justicia Juvenil Restaurativa (‘Restorative Juvenile Justice’), in Peru.

However, there may be other alternatives, such as setting up platforms of different stakeholders, such as occurred in the Sistema de Alerta Temprana de Deserción Escolar (‘School Dropout Early Warning System’) project, in Peñalolén, in which the organisational chart shows a ‘community and family management board’, whose principal authority is the manager, who is advised by a multidisciplinary professional team representing the different units that make up this management board. In turn, below the management board is an operational commission which is in charge of coordinating the project implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

It is important that the organisational structures clearly establish the role of each actor in the network, right through from planning to evaluation, and that spaces are included for dialogue between the organisations involved and advice received from external groups. Just as there are no ideal crime prevention projects, neither is there an ideal form of management, as each intervention will have its own organisational structure, depending on the type of activity and the number of actors involved.

This is how we can find simple organisational structures, with a general coordinator who manages work teams by theme or zones of intervention (like the Restorative Juvenile Justice project in Peru), and more complex organisational structures, which involve organisations with different structures that require a new space to be constructed for these organisations to come together with a common goal. Thus, for example, in the case of the Aulas en Paz (‘Classrooms in Peace’) project, in Colombia, there is an executive management area –within the non-governmental organisation– and a management area for evaluation, research and development –led by an academic body– and both work together on a board of directors.

Nevertheless, even when taking recommended planning precautions, the greatest obstacle facing the quest for a solid agenda of local and national public policies on security is trivialisation. Paradoxically, the role of the media or the electoral debate on security issues are factors that distance serious technical discussion on the issue and establish agendas of alleged speed, immediacy and apportioning blame which bring very little to the reflection process. Thus, a gap opens up between hopes for an immediate solution to the problems and the need to achieve medium and long-term results.

All these facts call for improved definitions of responsibilities for the different elements of the problem, as well as better mechanisms for implementation and evaluation. To address just part of this obstacle, it is important for interventions in citizen security to start thinking about using open and transparent dissemination mechanisms. Experience shows that much progress has been made with frameworks of interpretation and in the type of intervention, but on the management side there is still room for improvement, above all in all aspects of coordination and dissemination.
Politics dictated by opinion polls and subject to the need for fast results has undermined investment in evaluation resources. Monitoring (or follow-up) and evaluation are indispensable stages of every project, as they allow us to identify what works well and what does not, and why. Also, they are mechanisms that help to determine whether the activities are still in line with the planned objectives.

With monitoring, which is carried out throughout the entire period of activity, deficiencies, obstacles and adjustment needs are detected. Useful instruments that can be used include: observations from participants and non-participants, record books, audiovisual material, attendance registers and, in general, any type of tool that records progress, difficulties and successes, with the aim of considering modifications where necessary. In psychosocial interventions, clinical meetings between professionals are also a way of monitoring the process. An important part of this monitoring is linked to dissemination, to both internal and external stakeholders. If these activities are anticipated right from the start of the activity planning and are carried out systematically, they should not take up too many resources.

Evaluation, in turn, is designed to identify the changes produced by the project. In this process the structure, operation and results are analysed, which determines what decisions are made regarding the continuity of the project and validation of the intervention. Evaluations can include information that does not come directly from the project but that is relevant for determining its impact and results, such as police reports and surveys on victimisation, but it is also necessary to set up a specific information gathering system, with indicators consistent with the planned objectives, combining qualitative and quantitative instruments, and including the greatest possible number of stakeholders.

There are few initiatives that include complex evaluation systems that go beyond simply recording the activities and perceptions of the executors. Another mistake made when presenting evaluations is to base them on data and instruments created for other purposes, for example, police reports and surveys of victimisation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Types of evaluation of initiatives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of the strategy as a process</td>
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<tr>
<td>The aim is to verify the coherence between the context of application, the objectives and methodologies and the overall viability of the strategy. The opinions of stakeholders at different levels (leader, coordinator, technical teams) and of beneficiaries are collected.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Guide to local prevention. Toward policies of social cohesion and citizen security. UN-Habitat, Alberto Hurtado University, Chile.
victimisation. Although these are sources of data that enable the general situation to be monitored, they do not show the range of impacts that the projects may have on crime prevention as they are not designed with these specific objectives in mind.

Each project requires mechanisms to be established for follow-up, monitoring and evaluation (in its various stages) which can be implemented by the same executing teams, but which require at the same time the participation of external stakeholders (for example, experts) and the beneficiaries themselves, to avoid the partial or inadequate management of information. Other mechanisms used are surveys taken at different moments during the interventions, usually at the start and finish. If we add independent control groups to these mechanisms, the reliability of the evaluation is even greater. Building these specific information gathering systems for the project helps to overcome the difficulty of obtaining an organised system of consolidated information regarding security, as each institution in the system has its own methods of collecting information, with different goals and for different purposes, which leads to a lack of coordination, an overrepresentation or underrepresentation of certain phenomena in the figures.

Evaluation is possible with good resource planning and if clear aims are defined. For example, in 2007 the Restorative Juvenile Justice project in Peru launched a cost-benefit study to objectively compare the effectiveness and cost of the models in open environments and closed environments aimed at teenagers in trouble with the law. The most important outcome of the study revealed that the work done with teenagers in conflict with criminal law in open environments was less expensive and more efficient than the work done through programmes in closed environments. This was a key aspect in making the judicial authorities and other opinion leaders aware of the importance of redirecting public funds to create more programmes in open environments and less in closed environments. This demonstration is not only important for the project, but it could also have a big impact on the whole penitentiary system, by showing that the open system for offenders has positive effects. If this practice continues spreading and showing good results, it could be extended to the adult system and help to alleviate the prison crisis.

The monitoring in this project was carried out by local coordinators and their technical teams (immediate defence team, educational accompaniment and mediator team), which is positive, because it means that the same work team evaluates their achievements and makes a commitment to a systematic monitoring process. The results shown are broad and coherent with all the planned objectives, and also managed to provide the political impact proposed in the second phase of the project. It can be deduced that the monitoring carried out in the first phase enabled the operation to be improved and later extended to other cities. However, incorporating the victim

| Table 5. Restorative Juvenile Justice, Lima and Chiclayo, Peru |

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Validate the model of restorative juvenile justice and create conditions for its transfer to the state.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Sign conventions and collaboration agreements with institutions involved in juvenile justice.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Train teams specialised in restorative juvenile justice and victimology.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Widely disseminate the project in the mass media.</td>
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<td>- Apply remission of sentences and socio-educational measures, as well as psychosocial support.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Characteristics of the evaluation and methodology</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- National and international experts were enlisted to collaborate in the reflection and analysis of practices and on identifying the needs of the project.</td>
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<td>- Strategic planning workshops were run, allowing the model to be optimised.</td>
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<td>- An intranet database was set up so that records could be kept on each case that was reviewed.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Results</th>
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<tr>
<td>- Between 2005 and 2009 it was confirmed that 1,055 young people were detained in police stations.</td>
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<td>- Remissions increased from 8, between 2001 and 2004, to 244, between 2005 and 2009, with these young people being referred to educational guidance programmes.</td>
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<td>- It was possible to ensure the presence of a responsible family member in all the cases studied.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Collaboration agreements were signed with a total of 48 local institutions who agreed to admit young people to their programmes and services.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Victims were partially incorporated: during the project’s first three years 35 effective contacts were made with victims; of these, 21 reparation agreements or mediations were made, and only 6 were honoured.</td>
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<td>- Regular intersectoral coordination meetings were set up, enabling attorney intervention times in police stations to be improved.</td>
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<td>- 553 of the 1,055 young people participated in socio-educational programmes, of which 224 successfully completed the process.</td>
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<td>- Approximately 800 system operators were trained.</td>
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<td>- The magazine Justicia para Crecer was published quarterly.</td>
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<td>- A specialised module for assisting teenagers was set up in a police station in the district involved in the intervention.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The project was extended to the city of Chiclayo, where the number of remissions also rose from 24, between 2005 and 2007, to 92, between 2008 and 2009.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Between 2008 and 2009 the project assisted 84 victims of offences committed by teenagers and 95 minors that were victims of sexual abuse.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- University courses on restorative juvenile justice and a course on remission were designed with the National Magistrates Academy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- A study was carried out on the effectiveness of programmes in open environments.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The project was disseminated in print media, on radio and television.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- It won first place in the contest for best practices in the public management of citizen security.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- A global conference was organised on the subject.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The Department of Public Prosecution allocated a budget for developing the model of applying remission.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The Superior Court requested capacity-building for the project in order to apply the model to other cities in the country.</td>
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Objectives

- Identify violent juvenile groups in the municipality.
- Focus attention on these groups through a mediation and capacity-building plan in areas of human growth and development; prevention of drug use; crime prevention; human security and social protection factors.
- Occupy the young people’s free time with drawing and painting classes and practising sport.
- Integrate the family and the community into the process of social integrating young people.
- Improve police-community and police-teens relationships.

Characteristics of the evaluation and methodology

- Monitoring was carried out at fortnightly meetings with the technical team.
- Monitoring and follow-up meetings were held with community leaders, fathers, mothers and tutors and inter-group meetings were also organised with the police and the municipality.
- A survey was carried out at the start and finish of the intervention. It was created using a World Bank basic form, and included aspects regarding demographics, consumption habits, rules, attitudes, skills, family rules, partners, other behaviours, victimisation, weapons, personal security, personal evaluation and final evaluation.

Results

- Confrontations between the gangs involved stopped and public spaces were once again safe to walk around.
- Tolerance and respect achieved between the beneficiaries of the different groups were strengthened.
- 85 of the 100 young people were integrated into the workplace.
- The relationship between the municipality, a school and the police was strengthened.

In the reintegration project for young gang members, tools were used for monitoring and evaluation. In the case of monitoring, internal meetings were held with the technical team and the stakeholders involved (beneficiaries and support network). For evaluation purposes, the same meetings and a survey combining qualitative and quantitative instruments were used.

In this case, we should point out that the survey was carried out at the start and the finish of the project, which allowed the impact to be measured and not just to record the results. However, with the information supplied it is not possible to check whether all of the planned objectives were met, as the survey does not provide data on drug use, crime and the use of free time, and instead mentions effects that were not sought, such as improvements in the use of public spaces.

Another one of the prevention practices highlighted is the Safe Neighbourhoods Integrated Plan in the commune of...
Peñalolén, in Santiago, which used quantitative instruments, provided by external organisations (statements taken by Carabiniers, a survey on victimisation by the National Institute of Statistics and the fear index created by the Paz Ciudadana Foundation), and qualitative instruments, applied by the project’s own technical team, to carry out its evaluation. Nevertheless, the results supplied do not reflect the contribution made by the qualitative instruments, although the model presented is appropriate for measuring the planned objectives.

These are just some of the practices highlighted because of the evaluation model that was applied, as they combine different types of instruments and involve the community and external actors. The practices selected show a positive trend towards incorporating monitoring and evaluation with instruments that show important improvements over those used previously. We can also see a proper consistency between the types of instruments used and the objectives: when the projects include psychosocial support, they use instruments such as interviews, focus groups, meetings with the professional teams who help the beneficiaries, tests and evaluations that measure behavioural changes, etc. In contrast, when the projects focus on social and situational prevention, we find surveys on victimisation and the use of records of police reports, as well as surveys of the beneficiaries. Nevertheless, it would seem that these processes still require greater internalisation, as in many cases we have seen that when the results are returned not all the instruments used are mentioned.

Experience shows us that monitoring and evaluation are possible with sufficient resource planning and a commitment from the technical teams to apply the instruments while they are carrying out the activities. Disseminating the information that comes from the evaluations is necessary both for donors and financing agencies, as well as for the community. Transparency when delivering the results will help ensure the project’s visibility, continuity and probably its replicability too. It also helps to get the community on board, as they can inform themselves about the projects being carried out in their benefit and the results that have been obtained. Having emphasised the importance and need for evaluation, it is necessary to move on to the dissemination stage, which involves honest recognition of the results—the good and the not so good—, in order to fine-tune strategies and continue improving security.

The limitations of managing and evaluating citizen security projects have not hindered learning processes regarding the prevention initiatives underway. The most important of these lessons are: (i) prevention requires local focus and specificity; (ii) political will is variable and not very sustained over time; (iii) coordination between multiple institutions is not much practised; and (iv) if well-focused, initiatives can attack crime and the sensation of insecurity. Within this framework, the public’s demand for greater security has spread to mayors and municipal authorities, which establishes a suitable framework for local governments to see an opportunity to become the catalysts for innovative policies for preventing violence.

However, the local level must have its counterpart in national policy. To achieve this, greater civil democratic leadership capacity is needed. It is essential for security policies to be led by civil leaders whose decisions are evaluated without being restricted to a purely police angle. This goes hand-in-hand with the creation of non-governmental spaces that allow citizen security actions to be monitored. Examples of this type of tool are citizens’ audits and national public security councils with cross-sector representation. It is important that these types of tools collaborate with transparency and accountability and not with the direct running of projects. Mechanisms that promote transparency can contribute towards increasing public trust in institutions.

The control and evaluation of security policies have become a cross-sectorial need. Bodies that promote improvements in management and action are needed, in addition to the necessary definition of accountability mechanisms. In a complementary way, civil society can also play a prominent role in evaluating and monitoring both the experts and beneficiaries.

Managing the police and their relationship with the community

A greater professionalization of the police according to role is required, focusing efforts on the main functions of the police, i.e., the control and prevention of crime. To do this it is necessary to rethink welfare and administrative tasks; in many countries police action must be focused on police institutions’ problems relating to crime prevention and control. Therefore, many tasks that reduce institutional capacity to prevent and control criminal activity should be redefined. It is also necessary to improve police training and capacity-building systems; this should not involve just initial training, but continuous on-the-job training and updating knowledge, especially of technology and criminal investigation techniques. This also includes providing training on democratic principles and citizen security, emphasising that security is no longer the sole responsibility of the police and therefore this institution and its members should build collaboration.
relationships with other bodies, such as the judicial and prison systems, and establish a new relationship with citizens.

This new relationship with citizens involves using models like community policing, preventive policing and focusing on problem solving. Codes of ethics are a basic tool for police training that should be incorporated into these frameworks of understanding police work. What should be emphasised among the values and principles that guide police activity is the quality of them being public servants, of police serving citizens. This association with the community is a fundamental requisite for broadening police objectives of reducing the fear of crime and improving relationships and social order. Specialisation in certain matters and continuous training should be reinforced in order to reduce the chances of making mistakes in relationships with citizens and to consolidate the internal control of abuses of power.

The points mentioned above could be improved through the police academy curriculums, increasing the amount of teaching on law and ethics in order to halt abusive practices that harm relationships with the community. But this should not only be focused on the basic ranks, but above all on police leaders. Selection systems should move towards placing police candidates in specific situations in which they must resolve ethical dilemmas and make decisions subject to the particular demands of real circumstances of action such as time, space and imminent danger. There must be vigorous supervision of selection processes by the competent authorities, so that candidates that do not meet all the requirements do not slip through the net, even when there is a shortage of new recruits.

Nevertheless, in order for the police to establish good relations with the community, it is also necessary for the links between officers and the police institution itself to be strengthened, from a doctrinal perspective and dignifying the relationship between superiors and subordinates. In this regard, it is necessary to define a transparent inspectorate and advocacy system that eliminates the use of discretion in disciplinary processes.

A continuous improvement tool used by the police is performance evaluation, which should contain indicators directly associated with the quality of the service provided to citizens. People’s level of satisfaction regarding police work should be considered when working, both individually and as a group. Salary increases and social security systems, and the introduction of support and welfare services are essential and objective factors in re-evaluating the police role with citizens and the agents themselves.

Likewise, citizens’ advice centres, where people can, for example, lodge complaints, provide a double benefit; on the one hand, they offer citizens the chance to participate by expressing their opinions about the service and treatment they have received; on the other hand, they serve as input for the police for detecting weaknesses in their officers’ training and handling of power. This enables the service to be improved and for training and perfection needs to be refocused. However, this measure should go hand-in-hand with the effective responsibility of the state for police misconduct; this could have a positive impact on the relevant authorities’ exercise of power to supervise and control police activity.

Production and access to information

The lack of systematisation and reliability in the development of information systems is not only subject to political will, but also to the availability of resources. Systems of recording complaints and surveys on victimisation both require investments that enable the information to be updated periodically. The production of this information and its dissemination should form part of a state policy above political changes and changes of government. Likewise, it is advisable to move forward with the publication of data in yearbooks of criminal statistics, which reveal the total number of crimes in greater detail (according to territories, populations, etc.). This could be accompanied by other statistics that permit a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of crime, or include emerging issues, generated by the dynamic of violence and crime itself, such as gender violence, social conflict and school violence. Instruments of information should also provide data on the costs of violence, effectiveness of policies and budgetary efficiency, so that response capacities can also be judged.

Improving the system for handling the flow of complaints to the police, and information on crime in general, together with policies aimed at building stronger links with the community (through the police and prevention projects) will enable levels of public trust in the system’s institutions to be increased – a relevant aspect for social cohesion in terms of citizens’ assessments of the institutions that govern them. Improving the information system also requires building the capacities of the institutions involved (police, judicial system, prison system, etc.) in order to find a way to reduce the use of discretion, the loss of data and erroneous classification of information.

Nevertheless, the number of crimes reported to the police and the index of victimisation cannot be the main indicators of success in the management of public security. Information must be generated to measure the real impact of the diverse programmes and projects implemented to tackle violence and crime using the appropriate indicators of management, as well as gathering background on the criminal acts and, in particular, on who is committing them. Another area relates to the detail provided by administrative information – principally cases filed and terminated, crimes recorded, average processing time, number of cases per prosecutor and finalisation of cases– according to indicators that reflect the operation of the system at all levels.
Management

With regards management, it is necessary for both central and local levels to allocate specific budget resources to the public security sector, in which it should be feasible to monitor the resources involved in providing this service. Once the importance of the local level as the manager of citizen security has been established, it is then necessary to set realistic objectives in public policies that address violence and crime, distinguishing the problems of citizen security from other social problems that may be associated with insecurity, but that are not necessarily its cause. If this is not done, the result will be an agenda that does not allow a distinction between a genuine social problem and one of insecurity. To do this, it is useful to separately finance policies of control and prevention, so that the funds set aside for prevention are not depleted to develop initiatives.

Experience also indicates that to improve interventions in citizen security it is necessary to improve information systems, which are essential for generating accurate diagnoses and evaluations that match the planned objectives. Information on context and that generated specifically for the projects will, when disseminated, lead to greater support from citizens and will allow spaces to be opened up for the continuity of successful interventions.

Civil society

Finally, in order for citizen security to make a contribution to social cohesion, the importance of citizen participation must not be overlooked, bearing in mind what has been discussed throughout this document regarding the moments in which this participation can take place so that it makes a real contribution and helps to promote a democratic and comprehensive outlook of the problem of security and does not encourage penal populism.
### Promising local-level initiatives on citizen security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Latin America</th>
<th>Other continents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interventions in education and schools</td>
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<tr>
<td>School Dropout: Early Warning System (Municipality of Petatán)</td>
<td>Centre for Studies on Public Safety</td>
<td>International Centre for the Prevention of Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construyendo a Tiempo (Municipality of Petatán)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aulas en Paz (Colombia, Productive Coexistence Alliance–University of the Andes)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Preve Tren: A train that listens to you, in Pet and Guadalupe ysa (Concepción, Chile), as part of the Comuna Segura Programme</td>
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<td>Treu ne de sensibilización à l'agression indirecte, Psychological-school violence (Québec, Canada)</td>
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<td>Enlace Quêche (Guatemala)</td>
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<td>Conéctate Programme (Chile)</td>
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<td>Interventions with young people</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fuerza Joven Programme (Medellín, Colombia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Strategic Plan for Coexistence and Security, founded on Human Rights and from a Gender Perspective (Municipality of Pasto, Colombia)</td>
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<td>Trousse de sensibilisation à l'agression indirecte. Psychological-school violence (Québec, Canada)</td>
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<td>Caminos hacia la Prevención Project</td>
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<td>Equipo Colaba esperanza-ICE (Brazil)</td>
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<td>AfroReggae Cultural Group (Vogias, Brazil)</td>
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<td>OthoanGraffiti (São Paulo, Brazil)</td>
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<td>Social-Workplace Integration of Young People in Ulasano (El Salvador)</td>
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<td>Midnight Sports Programme (Brazil)</td>
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<td>Jóvenes Jóvenes Youth Programme (Morón)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fire-Fighter Cadet Academy (San Pedro de la Paz, Chile), Part of the national Comuna Segura Programme</td>
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<td>Effective Prevention Programmes (England and Wales)</td>
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<td>Bayti-My Home Association (Morocco)</td>
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<td>Orizzonti a Colori (Rome, Italy)</td>
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<td>Operation Reclaim (Stirling, Scotland)</td>
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<td>C’est pas graffe! (Belgium)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Peace Squares Project (São Paulo, Brazil)</td>
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### Promising local-level initiatives on citizen security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rowing School for Young People at Risk (Valdivia, Chile)</th>
<th>Part of the Comuna Segura Programme</th>
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<tr>
<td>La Vida A Paz (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)</td>
<td>A Viva Rio Project</td>
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<td>Luta pela Paz (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil)</td>
<td>The Comuna Segura Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>Le Prince Serpent, Punnave Theatre (Quebec, Canada)</td>
<td>The Viva Rio Project</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intervention, family support</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safe Place for Young People at Risk (Quebec, Canada)</td>
<td>Soutien à la parentalité: Parenthood support (Montreuil, France)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ba Ya Ya, Belgium (Support for young people and their parents, intra-family mediation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Work with immigrants, indigenous peoples (racial condition)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Defence Councils, (Ayacucho, Peru)</td>
<td>Training for Aboriginal Alcohol and Drug Workers (Victoria, Australia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Integration with Peruvian Immigrants, Independencia police station (Santiago, Chile)</td>
<td>Project Venture for Young Indigenous People (Canada)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Capacity-building for Indigenous Facilitators (Guatemala)</td>
<td>Project Nipppart (Nippart, Australia)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Diadema experience, São Paulo, Brazil (controlling bar closing, exchanging toy guns for comics) (police participation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Control measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safe Neighbourhoods Integrated Plan</td>
<td>Crime Prevention: Security and Prevention Contracts (Belgium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban Security Policy in Chile Comuna Segura Programme</td>
<td>Kabin – System of Police Huts (Japan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Picó Viver Programme (Belo Horizonte, Brazil) (police participation)</td>
<td>Safe Cities (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The Diadema experience, São Paulo, Brazil (controlling bar closing, exchanging toy guns for comics) (police participation)</td>
<td>Ruut Project: Work in juvenile networks: transforming the life of young people at risk (Finland)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Local Crime Prevention (Peru)</td>
<td>Community Policing (Bophut)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Promising local-level initiatives on citizen security

| Reintegration, rehabilitation |
|------------------------------|---------------------|
| Social Reintegration of High-Risk Teenagers and Young People (Nicaragua) | Reintegration, Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Nigerian Deportees (Haiti) |
| Victim-Aggressor Mediation (Sweden) |
| Surveillance and public security, courts |
| Surveillance and public security, courts |
| Safer Cities (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) | Community Policing (Kenya) |
| Ruut Project: Work in juvenile networks: transforming the life of young people at risk (Finland) | Feminin: Social and cultural mediators (France) |
| Community Policing (Bophut) | Social Mediation Centre, Sant Pere de Ribes Town Council (Spain) |
| Children’s Mediation in Nursery Schools – Colegio Mayor (Santiago, Chile) | Victim-Aggressor Mediation (Sweden) |
| Ceasefire and Safe Streets Projects (Baltimore and Chicago, USA) | Social Mediation Centres, Saint-Pierre de Nîmes Town Council (France) |
| Youth for Change and Conflict Resolution (Colombia) | Pilot Project for Resolving Community Disputes and Capacity to Solve Conflicts (South Africa) |
| Mediation and Non-Formal Education Programme for Teenagers and Young People at High Social Risk (Nicaragua) | femenin: Social and cultural mediators (France) |
| São Paulo em Paz (Brazil) | Social Mediation Centre, Sant Pere de Ribes Town Council (Spain) |
| Victim-Aggressor Mediation (Sweden) | Victim-Aggressor Mediation (Sweden) |

### Intervention, family support

| Safe Neighbourhoods Integrated Plan | Crime Prevention: Security and Prevention Contracts (Belgium) |
| Urban Security Policy in Chile Comuna Segura Programme | Kabin – System of Police Huts (Japan) |
| Picó Viver Programme (Belo Horizonte, Brazil) (police participation) | Safe Cities (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) |
| The Diadema experience, São Paulo, Brazil (controlling bar closing, exchanging toy guns for comics) (police participation) | Ruut Project: Work in juvenile networks: transforming the life of young people at risk (Finland) |
| Local Crime Prevention (Peru) | Community Policing (Bophut) |

### Work with immigrants, indigenous peoples (racial condition)

| Community Defence Councils, (Ayacucho, Peru) | Training for Aboriginal Alcohol and Drug Workers (Victoria, Australia) |
| Community Integration with Peruvian Immigrants, Independencia police station (Santiago, Chile) | Project Venture for Young Indigenous People (Canada) |
| Capacity-building for Indigenous Facilitators (Guatemala) | Project Nipppart (Nippart, Australia) |
| The Diadema experience, São Paulo, Brazil (controlling bar closing, exchanging toy guns for comics) (police participation) |

### Control measures

| Safe Neighbourhoods Integrated Plan | Crime Prevention: Security and Prevention Contracts (Belgium) |
| Urban Security Policy in Chile Comuna Segura Programme | Kabin – System of Police Huts (Japan) |
| Picó Viver Programme (Belo Horizonte, Brazil) (police participation) | Safe Cities (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania) |
| The Diadema experience, São Paulo, Brazil (controlling bar closing, exchanging toy guns for comics) (police participation) | Ruut Project: Work in juvenile networks: transforming the life of young people at risk (Finland) |
| Local Crime Prevention (Peru) | Community Policing (Bophut) |
## Promising Local-Level Initiatives on Citizen Security

### Urban Mediation Team Project-EMU (Quebec, Canada)

- Ndaawin Project (Winnipeg, Canada)

### Urban Renovation/Social Urbanism

- Safer Neighbourhoods Programme (Birmingham, England and Wales)
- Outreach Work and Spatial Welfare Practices to Prevent and Fight Urban Crime (Italy)
- Social Urbanism as a Crime Prevention Strategy (Medellín, Colombia)

### Research, Observatories

- Construction of an Observatory of Crime (Municipality of St-Eustache, Quebec, Canada)
- Humberside Community Problem Solving Kit (United Kingdom)

### New Community Institutional Framework

- Challenge 51 and Challenge 100 Project (Busterrpska)
- Programme in Association (Election of director of crime prevention by mayor)
- Safer cities: Prevention of Urban Crime, Violence and Insecurity (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania)
- Local Advisory Council on Security and Crime Prevention and Decentralised Local Advisory Councils (Bonavent, France)
- Community Board for Urban Security (Municipality of Chobán, Argentina)
- Breaking the Cycle: Youth Gang Exit and Ambassador Leadership Project (Toronto, Canada)

### Victim Support

- Jamaica Assistance Centre for Persons at Risk (Municipality of Haulín, Querétaro, Mexico)
- Vieillir sans violence (Quebec, Canada)

### Victim Support

- NoHil (Hungary)
- Use of Social Workers in the National Police and French Gendarmerie (France)
- Family Safety Teams (New Zealand)
- Residential Break and Enter Project (Norwood municipality and Tea Tree Gully, Australia)
- SADNA, Dispositif d’aide aux victimes d’urgence (France)
- Muslim Family Safety Project (London and Ontario, Canada)
- Community Crisis Response Programme (Toronto, Canada)

### Integrated Projects

- Community Action Programme on Security (Saint Lucia)
- Proudly Muizenberg (South Africa)
- Chance on Main (Tuamata, Australia)
- Tangentyere Model, focused on the indigenous population in camps (Alice Springs, Australia)
- The Runai Action Project-RAAP ( Waitakere, New Zealand)
- SNAP® Under 12 Project (Toronto, Canada)

Created by Tamara Ramos.
### Table: Project Summaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Name and Location</th>
<th>Project Description</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Role of the municipality</th>
<th>Other actors</th>
<th>Type of activities carried out</th>
<th>Evaluations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Reintegration of Juvenile Delinquents, Alajuela, Costa Rica</td>
<td>A program focused on recovering the rights of minors and providing them with new opportunities.</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization: Asociación Encuentro, Casa de la Juventud.</td>
<td>To prevent the reincorporation of minors into crime.</td>
<td>Mentoring and individual and group psychological assistance; workshops in various areas.</td>
<td>Psycho-educational workshops for parents and coordination with the social network.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiative for Older Adolescents and Young Adults, Medellín, Colombia</td>
<td>An initiative promoting local mechanisms of social protection.</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization: The Ayara Family Artistic and Social Foundation.</td>
<td>To promote the social reintegration of minors in conflict with the law.</td>
<td>Clinical evaluations, therapy, workshops, and mentors.</td>
<td>Municipalities and coalitions in support of adolescent leadership training, summer camps, and community services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project YIP-Colombians Reborn in Hip Hop, Bogotá, Colombia</td>
<td>Promote the participation of young people in the decision-making process.</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization: Coalition in Support of Adolescent Leadership Training, Jamaica.</td>
<td>To improve the educational and social opportunities of young people.</td>
<td>Mentoring and coordination with professional groups.</td>
<td>Educational and social programmes.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes
- It is thought that the fact that young people perceived a sense of belonging to their territory gave the project continuity.
- Insecurity in the conflict and the reluctance of young people were obstacles.
- It sought to develop a sense of belonging and solidarity in the young people, and encourage them to accept the rules of coexistence in order not to commit violent acts.
- The aim was to develop a sense of belonging in young people involved with gangs.
- It involved the use of local social support networks.
- A survey was carried out with a control group at the start and finish, plus follow-up meetings. It appealed to the community to offer follow-up and support for young people.
- It aimed to promote local mechanisms of social protection.
### Prevention of intrafamily violence and child abuse

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project name and country</th>
<th>Executor</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Role of the municipality</th>
<th>Other actors</th>
<th>Type of activities carried out</th>
<th>Contribution to social cohesion</th>
<th>Facilitating elements or obstacles</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Units for the Prevention of Violence within the Framework of Human Rights, Colombia.</td>
<td>Provincial Government of Antioquia and Universidad de los Andes.</td>
<td>Promote human rights and educate and attend to victims of intrafamily violence, drug addicts.</td>
<td>Received training and collaborated in the diagnosis.</td>
<td>Family police stations/professional training.</td>
<td>Implementation and deployment of mobile units of professional officers and attending to victims.</td>
<td>Not trust in local institutions and promote social ethics around human rights.</td>
<td>The political will of the governmental and municipal administration was crucial, but bureaucratic processes and insecurity conditions were not always ideal.</td>
<td>An evaluation of processes and results is planned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Force: Programme: Medellín, Colombia.</td>
<td>Municipality of Medellín.</td>
<td>Coordinate the local government’s programme for supporting prevention and interventions in vulnerable young people and the reintegration of convicted young offenders and ex-gang members.</td>
<td>It is based on workshops in prisons, recreational activities and community work, psychosocial and legal advice.</td>
<td>Preventation workshops in prisons, recreational activities and community work, psychosocial and legal advice.</td>
<td>Contribute to building social capital.</td>
<td>The political will and positive perception of the community were facilitators.</td>
<td>Not mentioned.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systematisation of Community Surveillance, Medellín, Colombia.</td>
<td>Municipality of Medellín.</td>
<td>Reduce the perception of insecurity through the implementation of new resources for the police and the improvement of their relationship with the community.</td>
<td>Local police, educational, health and social institutions collaborated on the project.</td>
<td>Installation of networks for internet access, a radio network between the institutions involved and new equipment for the police.</td>
<td>Contribute to building trust in the police and between institutions.</td>
<td>The political will of the municipalities and the team’s prior experience were positive, while there was resistance from educational institutions.</td>
<td>They indicate that evaluations were done before, during and at the end of the project, public statistics and a survey on information are mentioned.</td>
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### Multi-agency prevention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project name and country</th>
<th>Executor</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
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<th>Other actors</th>
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<th>Contribution to social cohesion</th>
<th>Facilitating elements or obstacles</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salt Neighbourhoods Initiative/Plan, Petrópolis, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.</td>
<td>Municipality of Petrópolis.</td>
<td>Improve the perception of security held by the inhabitants of the commune.</td>
<td>The entire network of municipal organisations is involved, plus the police.</td>
<td>Community dialogues, capacity-building and social institutions collaborated on the project.</td>
<td>Foster the development of social capital and a sense of belonging and solidarity.</td>
<td>The mayor’s credibility, the support of the police and the commitment of the institutions were positive. In contrast, the perception of insecurity and central control in the only answer was obstacles to overcome.</td>
<td>Not mentioned because the diagnosis phase.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated Construction of the Strategic Plan for Conurbation Rondônia (municipal).</td>
<td>Municipality of Porto Velho.</td>
<td>Construct a strategic plan coordinating the various local institutions.</td>
<td>Collaboration with UNDP and University of Rondônia. The police also provided support.</td>
<td>Carry out a participatory diagnosis with different municipal institutions and provide capacity-building through a diplomatic council.</td>
<td>The aim is to generate social capital in the municipality by building trust between institutions and with the community.</td>
<td>Not mentioned because the diagnosis phase.</td>
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### Promotion, dissemination and local development

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project name and country</th>
<th>Executor</th>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Role of the municipality</th>
<th>Other actors</th>
<th>Type of activities carried out</th>
<th>Contribution to social cohesion</th>
<th>Facilitating elements or obstacles</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Venetian Observation of Criminal Security Construction of a geo-referenced map of crime and eliminating a culture of crime and anarchy in Venezuela.</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisations: Químicas Rutas.</td>
<td>Install a platform of crime information to identify security problems and disseminate policies.</td>
<td>Collaborative work is not mentioned, only universities, INPD and community as beneficiaries.</td>
<td>Collection of information and dissemination on a website and via print media, and formulation of policy recommendations.</td>
<td>Not identified.</td>
<td>Not mentioned because the diagnosis phase.</td>
<td>An evaluation of results is planned using the quantity of publications and visits to the websites.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action on low, project: São Paulo, Brazil.</td>
<td>Non-governmental organisation: São Paulo.</td>
<td>Reduce theft of cables, promoting alternative work for the population.</td>
<td>The Telefónica Foundation collaborated and managed the start of the initiative.</td>
<td>Implementation of qualitative and best methodologies in the diagnostic, social and preventive interventions (examinations, capacity-building, new working strategies, etc.).</td>
<td>Promote social welfare, peaceful coexistence and solidarity.</td>
<td>The association with the municipality was a key aspect, as were those with other institutions, the police. However, sometimes there was a tendency to look at the problem as private and not a social matter. Sustainability is also seen as a problem in the future.</td>
<td>Monitoring and results reported and police statistics.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliographical references


URB-AL III is a regional decentralised cooperation programme run by the European Commission, the aim of which is to contribute towards increasing the level of social cohesion in sub-national and regional groups in Latin America.

Led by Diputació de Barcelona, the URB-AL III Programme Orientation and Coordination Office’s mission is to facilitate the implementation of the programme by providing technical assistance and support in the different projects in order to help achieve the programme’s objectives.